Attorneys' Fees for Contractual NonSignatories Under California Civil Code
Section 1717: A Remedy in Search of a
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ROBERT S. MILLER*

As the American Rule of attorneys' fees has come under attack in
recent years, courts in California have eroded the effect of the Rule
in contract actions pursuant to California Civil Code Section 1717,
which makes contractual fee-shifting provisions reciprocal. This ad
hoc approach has led to inequitable and unpredictable results. This
Article proposes that the statute should be amended to clarify that
contractual fee-shifting applies only to signatories to the contract.
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Let all the laws be clear, uniform and precise: to interpret laws is almost always
to corrupt them.
Voltaire'
INTRODUCTION

Under the American Rule of attorneys' fees, which prevails in
California and throughout the United States, each side in a lawsuit must
pay its own attorneys' fees, regardless of the outcome of the litigation.
As the cost of litigating even relatively minor lawsuits has spiralled

1. A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL QUOTATIONS 18 (1987), cited in Harris v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. App. 4th 661, 667, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 564, 568 (1992).
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upward,2 litigants and their· attorneys have become ever more enterprising and aggressive in seeking to enlarge exceptions to the American
Rule in an effort to shift the burden of the prevailing parties' attorneys'
fees to the losing party. Probably the largest exception to the American
Rule is that which allows parties to a contract to shift attorneys' fees by
agreement. In recent years, litigants in California have successfully
enlarged the scope of the contractual exception to the American Rule,
logically applying only to parties to an agreement, to include contractual
non-signatories involved in contract actions. Ambiguous language in
Civil Code section 1717, which governs awards of attorneys' fees
provided for by a contractual provision, makes this incongruity
possible. 3
This Article examines the application of fee-shifting under Civil Code
section 1717 to cases involving contractual non-signatories. A review
of the background of the American Rule and the legislative history of
Civil Code section 1717 reveals that the statute was never intended to
allow fee-shifting in cases involving contractual non-signatories.
Nevertheless, a series of appellate cases gradually extended the scope of
the statute so that the fee-shifting rule now prevails in a wide range of
cases involving contractual non-signatories. This Article examines the
many practical and theoretical problems created by broadly applying feeshifting under Civil Code section 1717. The focus then turns to the
potential benefits of wider fee-shifting. In conclusion, this Article argues
that Civil Code section 1717 should be amended to return it to its
original purpose and to clarify that the statute only applies to parties to
the contract in dispute.
Part I of this Article traces the development and establishment of a
non-signatory's right to attorneys' fees under section 1717. This section
begins with a brief discussion of the American Rule and of the
contractual exception to the rule. Civil Code section 1717 was intended
2. In some cases, attorneys' fees vastly exceed the total sum in dispute. For
example, in Camporeale v. Southshore Beach and Tennis Club Apts., No. A057143 (Cal.
Ct. App., October 19, 1994) cited in Barbara Steuart, No Joke: $100 Dispute Spawns
More Than $1 Million in Fees, THE RECORDER, Oct. 21, 1994, at 1, a landlord-tenant
dispute over a $100 fee yielded an attorneys' fees award of $422,258. See also Deane
Gardenhome Ass'n v. Denktas, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 1399, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 816,817
(1993) (the monetary value of the dispute was less than $1,800, and the court awarded
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party of $15,000).
3. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 171 ?(a) (West Supp. 1995), discussed infra text accompanying notes 34-36.
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mainly as a consumer protection law, enacted specifically to address feeshifting provisions in mass contracts benefitting only the drafters. Part
I traces how courts then judicially extended the effects of section 1717
well beyond this intended focus to cases involving contractual nonsignatories. The California Supreme Court approved the extension of
section 1717 to. non-signatories in Reynolds Metals Co. v. A/person.4
The Reynolds court failed, however, to cite any theoretical basis for its
decision, nor did it clarify how to apply the statute in future cases.
Part II discusses the rules that have evolved since Reynolds, implementing fee-shifting under Civil Code section 1717 in cases involving
contractual non-signatories. It begins with a description of the kinds of
cases in which courts have allowed fee-shifting in favor of and against
non-signatories. Discussion then turns to the theories used by the courts
to justify such fee-shifting: estoppel and mutuality. Courts have applied
both theories to provide an award of attorneys' fees in a wide range of
cases.
Part III discusses the practical and theoretical problems with the
application of fee-shifting under section 1717 to contractual nonsignatories. Neither the language nor legislative purpose of the statute
provides any basis for the broad fee-shifting currently permitted under
section 1717. On a more practical level, the theories used to justify such
fee-shifting could permit fee-shifting in many cases where the prevailing
party has no legal, equitable, or contractual right to recover attorneys'
fees. Because the courts properly refuse to award fees in such cases,
however, the theories yield wildly inconsistent and unpredictable results
in practice. Accordingly, both theories are useless tools for accurately
predicting when contractual non-signatories will be subject to fee-shifting
pursuant to section 1717. This confusion creates further problems for
the courts and litigants, including increased litigation and lower
credibility for the courts.
Part IV shifts to a survey of the arguments in favor of fee-shifting
under section 1717. These include fairness, providing proper economic
incentives for filing suits, punishing parties who bring frivolous suits,
compensating the prevailing party, and increasing the likelihood of
settlement. Analysis of each of these arguments shows that they do not
provide strong support for fee-shifting under section 1717 in cases
involving contractual non-signatories.
On balance, the arguments in favor of wide application of section
1717 are not as compelling as the arguments against allowing nonsignatories to recover fees under a contractual provision. This Article

4.
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proposes a legislative amendment to section 1717 limiting application of
this statute to parties to the contract, thereby eliminating the raft of
problems associated with applying section 1717 to contractual nonsignatories.

I.

THE AMERICAN RULE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES,
THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 1717, AND ITS

APPLICATION TO CONTRACTUAL NON-SIGNATORIES

A.

The American Rule ofAttorneys' Fees

Before discussing section 1717 itself, it is first necessary to explain the
American Rule, as well as the arguments for and against it. The
American Rule is codified in California in Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.5 Under the American Rule, each side pays its own
attorneys' fees in litigation regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit.
There are three general categories of exceptions to the American Rule:
contractual,6 statutory,7 and equitable. 8 The American Rule has long

5. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West Supp. 1995) provides: "Except as
attorney's fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of
compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or
implied, of the parties; but parties to actions or proceedings are entitled to their costs,
as hereinafter provided."
·
6. Id.; see also Nevin v. Salk, 45 Cal. App. 3d 331,338, 119 Cal. Rptr. 370,373
(1975) (approving of contractual fee-shifting provision under § 1021); John F. Vargo,
The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Access to Justice,
42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1578-79 (1993).
7. Hundreds of California statutes provide for fee-shifting, found in almost every
one of the state's codes. See RICHARD M. PEARL, CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS
§§ 7.1-7.14 (2d ed. 1994) (listing over 400 fee-shifting statutes); James P. Benoit, Note,
City of Burlington v. Dague: When You Wish Upon A Lodestar for Reasonable Attorney
Fees, 24 PAC. L.J. 1567, 1579 n.62 (1993) (listing over 200 fee-shifting statutes); see
also Note, State Attorney Fee-Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing The American
Rule?, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321 (1984) (noting a trend of an increased
incidence of fee-shifting statutes throughout the United States and listing almost 2000
state fee-shifting statutes).
.
.
8. See Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 34-43, 569 P.2d 1303, 1306-13, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 318-24 (1977) (setting forth three equitable exceptions in California to the
American Rule: the common fund doctrine, the substantial benefit doctrine, and the
private attorney general doctrine). See generally PEARL, supra note 7, §§ 7.1-7.14;
Jineen T. Cuddy, Comment, Fee Simple? Indeterminable: Inconsistent Procedures
Regarding Attorney Fees and Posting Appeal Bonds, 24 PAC. L.J. 141, 150-53 (1992),
for a discussion of these equitable exceptions to the American Rule in California.
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prevailed in California9 and throughout the country. 10 Other nations
have allowed for broad fee-shifting provisions in favor of the prevailing
party. This system is commonly known as the Indemnity Rule, because
the losing party indemnifies the prevailing party for her attorneys'
fees, 11 or as the British or English Rule, because this system prevails
in the United Kingdom. 12 In fact, the so-called British Rule has been
adopted by most other countries in the world. 13
Several arguments are usually interposed in favor of the American
Rule. First is the concern that broad fee-shifting in all cases would
discourage meritorious claims by individuals and thereby reduce their
access to justice. "The American Rule is based upon the philosophy that
'one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a
lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting
actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees
of their opponents' counsel."' 14 This effect could be especially
pronounced if a party intends to bring a test case involving new and
undecided concepts of law. 15 Second, fee-shifting might increase
litigation costs because the increased incentive for victory and the
increased costs of defeat would induce parties to commit greater

9. The American Rule was first codified in California in 1851, by Stats. 1851,
c.5, § 494 at 128. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021, Historical Note (West 1980).
10. The American Rule has prevailed in American courts for almost as long as
there have been American courts. The United States Supreme Court first enunciated the
rule in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 613 (1796), and most recently reaffirmed
the rule in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). For
a history of the American Rule, see Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 87377 (1929); John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee
Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984); Vargo, supra note 6, at 1570-78.
11. See Philip J. Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination of The Indemnity
System, 55 IOWA L. REV. 26 (1969).
12. See Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing, 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967); Goodhart,
supra note 10; Herbert M. Kritzer, Searching for Winners in A Loser Pays System, 54
AB.A. J. 55, 56-58 (1992); Vargo, supra note 6, at 1601-13, for a description of the
history and practice of fee awards in the United Kingdom.
13. See Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience With Attorney Fee Shifting,
47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (1984) (noting that two-way fee-shifting is the norm
in Europe); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory ofAttorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651,651 n.1 (1982) (noting that the only other major country
that follows the American Rule is Japan); Frances K. Zemans, Fee Shifting and the
Implementation ofPublic Policy, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 188 (1984) (noting
that the United States is the only common law jurisdiction in which each party pays her
own attorneys' fees).
14. Young v. Redman, 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 835-36, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86, 91 (1976)
(quoting Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing, 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967)); see also
Sciarrotta v. Teaford Custom Retailing, Inc., 110 Cal. App. 3d 444, 452, 167 Cal. Rptr.
889, 894 (1980); 44th Annual Judicial Conference of the D.C. Circuit, 100 F.R.D. 111,
175 (1983).
15. See Rowe, supra note 13, at 655.
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resources into each case. 16 Third, fee-shifting might discourage
settlement. Adding the possibility of recovering fees into the litigants'
calculus of the settlement value of their cases could make settlement less
likely. 17 The British Rule also creates satellite litigation about the
attorneys' fees themselves, further clogging the courts and adding to
litigation costs. 18
Numerous arguments have also been arrayed on the other side of this
debate, in favor of the British Rule. First, it is unfair for prevailing
parties to pay their own attorneys' fees when the fees can legitimately
be described as an element of damages. Litigation will not make
prevailing parties whole when they bear the burden of paying their own
attorneys' fees because such payment will take a significant portion of
the recovery. 19 Second, fee-shifting could encourage parties with small
monetary claiins and a high probability of recovery to bring an action.
For example, an individual with a near certainty of prevailing on a small
or non-monetary claim may still not commence a lawsuit under the
American Rule if prosecution were to cost more than the amount at
stake. This is particularly true of individuals with limited financial
resources facing richer opporients.20 Third, the threat of fee-shifting

16. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 574 (4th ed. 1992);
Ronald Braeutigam et al., An Economic Analysis ofAlternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1984); John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settlement, and
Litigation, or I'll Be Suing You, 18 J. LEGAL STIJD. 157 (1989); Avery Katz, Measuring
the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheapel?, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
143 (1987); Mause, supra note 11, at 37; Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The
English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 345, 370-75 (1990).
17. See Steven Shaven, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under
Alternative Methods for the Allocation ofLegal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 65 (1982)
(noting lower settlement rates under British Rule).
18. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 572.
19. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society,
54 CAL. L. REV. 792 (1966); Michael F. Mayer & Wayne Stix, The Prevailing Party
Should Recover Counsel Fees, 8 AKRON L. REV. 426 (1974); Rowe, supra note 13, at
653-59 (breaking this argument into a fairness component and a compensation
component); Mark S. Stein, Is One-Way Fee Shifting Fairer Than Two-Way Fee
Shifting?, 141 F.R.D. 351 (1992) (citing the make - wholeprinciple in support ofone-way
pro-plaintiff fee-shifting); Phyllis A. Monroe, Comment, Financial Barriers to
Litigation: Attorney Fees and the Problem ofLegal Access, 46 ALB. L. REV. 148, 165
(1982).
20. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 19, at 795-96; Mause, supra note 11, at 26, 33,
42; Rowe, supra note 13, at 665-66; Shaven, supra note 17, at 59-60; Monroe, supra
note 19, at 159-61.
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could deter some frivolous claims and serve to punish those who bring
such claims. Potential litigants might think twice before pursuing weak
claims if they know the penalty for failure includes payment of the
prevailing party's attorneys' fees. 21 Fourth, fee-shifting could make
settlement more likely as litigants would seek to avoid the risk of
bearing the other side's attorneys' fees. 22
Intense debate has raged for many years among academics and jurists
over the relative merits of the American and the British Rules.23
Recently, this discussion has become part of public political discourse
over the role of litigation in American society. There has been a public
reexamination of the effect of the American Rule on litigation in this
country and of the possibility of eliminating the American Rule in whole
or in part.24 The American Rule has stubbornly resisted calls for
change up to this point, however.

21. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 19, at 797; Rowe, supra note 13, at 662-63, 66566; Shaven, supra note 17, at 59-60; Kenneth Starr, The Shifting Panorama ofAttorney's
Fees Awards: The Expansion of Fee Recoveries in Federal Court, 28 S. TEX. L. REV.
189, 226-27 (1987); Zemans, supra note 13, at 193.
22. See John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell
Can't Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093 (1991); see
also Bradley L. Smith, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees: Their
Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2154 (1992).
23. For a history of this debate, see Leubsdorf, supra note 10. For a general
bibliography of the major commentaries on this subject, see Kathryn M. Christie,
Attorney Fee Shifting: A Bibliography, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 347 (1984). For
a review of the extensive law and economics literature on the subject, see Richard D.
Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their
Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067 (1989); Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and
Incentives to Comply with the Law, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1069 (1993).
24. A bill to adopt a form of the British Rule in all federal cases based on
diversity jurisdiction has recently been proposed in the U.S. House of Representatives
as the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act, HR 10. In the Senate, the proposed Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1995, S243, contains a similar provision. Mark Thompson, Who
Wins When the Loser Pays?, S.F. DAILY J., Feb. 10, 1995, at 1. These proposals are
part of the Republican Party's "Contract With America," and are allegedly intended to
prevent frivolous lawsuits. David Seidman, Odds on the Contract, TIME, Jan. 9, 1995,
at 27. The proposals are modeled on a similar effort begun in the Bush Administration
under the aegis of the President's Council on Competitiveness, led by Vice President
Quayle, which also advocated two-way fee-shifting. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON
COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 8-9 (1991). In addition,
Governor Wilson is currently sponsoring a bill in the California Assembly to require feeshifting in cases in which a party refuses a formal settlement offer and then subsequently
fails to obtain a more favorable judgment. In proposing this legislation, Governor
Wilson stated that it would "curb the plague of lawsuits" which are driving jobs out of
the state. CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE ANALYSIS STATEMENT, BILL No. AB 54, May 10,
1995. See also Kritzer, supra note 12, at 56-58.
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B.

The Contractual Exception and the Enactment of
Civil Code Section 1717

. The contractual exception to the American Rule is probably the most
widely used means of fee-shifting in California. Pursuant to the
contractual exception, parties to a contract may agree to opt out of the
American Rule in any manner which they desire. Typically, parties will
agree to adopt the British Rule so that the loser in any litigation arising
under the contract will pay the winner's attorneys' fees. The contractual
exception is not limited to this typical case, however. Contracting
parties could construct any fee-shifting rule they desired. For example,
parties could agree that only the defendant could recover fees if he
prevailed in any action on the contract. This would create a steep
disincentive for parties to initiate any lawsuits unless they were very
confident of success. Another possible variant is a contract provision
allowing the prevailing party to recover up to a :fixed amount of
attorneys' fees or up to a :fixed percentage of the contract amount as
attorneys' fees, in order to limit the exposure of either party in potential
litigation.25
A more nefarious possibility is the contract providing for only one
party to the contract, typically the drafter, or the party with greater
bargaining power, to recover attorneys' fees. Through such a provision,
large corporations and organizations could take advantage of their
superior bargaining power vis-a-vis individuals and impose a one-way
fee-shifting provision in mass consumer contracts. The contract could
require the individual consumer to pay the corporation's attorneys' fees
if the corporation prevailed in any suit over the contract, but would not
impose a corresponding burden on the corporation if the individual
prevailed in any such litigation. This provision would obviously deter
litigation by normally risk-averse individuals against corporate defendants. One court described such one-way fee-shifting provisions as
"instruments of oppression to force settlements of dubious or
unmeritorious claims."26 Such unilateral attorneys' fees provisions

25. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 25 Cal. 3d 124, 130, 599 P.2d 83, 86, 158
Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1979) (approving such a contractual provision).
26. Coast Bank v. Holmes, 19 Cal. App. 3d 581, 596-97, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30, 39
(1971).
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were found in many contracts in California, including mass consumer
contracts such as promissory notes,27 deeds of trust,28 factoring agreements,29 rental agreements,30 construction contracts,3 1 and association
by-laws. 32 Such fee-shifting provisions were generally enforceable. 33
In response to this problem, in 1968, the Legislature enacted Civil
Code section 1717. The central and most heavily litigated provision of
section 1717 is the initial paragraph, which provides:
In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that
attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be
awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party
who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she
is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable
attorney's fees in addition to other costs. 34

This provision requires that all contracts that include fee-shifting clauses
be reciprocal. Thus, the prevailing party will recover her fees in every
contract action in which the contract provides for fee-shifting. 35

27. See, e.g., Bank.ofldaho v. Pine Avenue Assocs., 137 Cal. App. 3d 5, 8, 186
Cal. Rptr. 695, 697 (1982); Associated Convalescent Enters. v. Carl Marks & Co., Inc.,
33 Cal. App. 3d 116, 118 n.1, 108 Cal. Rptr. 782, 783 n.1 (1973); Coast Bank, 19 Cal.
App. 3d at 593, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 37; see also 7 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE
§ 134(1) (3d ed. 1985) (citing cases).
28. See, e.g., Valley Bible Ctr. v. Western Title Ins. Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 931,
932, 188 Cal. Rptr. 335, 336 (1983); Star Pac. Inv., Inc. v. Oro Hills Ranch, Inc., 121
Cal. App. 3d 447,459, 176 Cal. Rptr. 546, 552 (1981); see also WITKIN, supra note 27,
§ 134(2) (citing cases).
29. See, e.g., T.E.D. Bearing Co. v. Walter E. Heller Co., 38 Cal. App. 3d 59, 62
n.4, 112 Cal. Rptr. 910, 913 n.4 (1974).
30. See, e.g., Hastings v. Matlock, 171 Cal. App. 3d 826,831,217 Cal. Rptr. 856,
860 (1985); San Luis Obispo Bay Properties, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 28 Cal.
App. 3d 556, 570, 104 Cal. Rptr. 733, 743 (1972); see also WITKIN, supra note 27,
§ 134(3).
31. See, e.g., Ecco-Phoenix Blee. Corp. v. Howard J. White, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 266,
272, 461 P.2d 33, 36, 81 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1969); Sciarrotta v. Teaford Custom
Remodeling, Inc., 110 Cal. App. 3d 444,446, 167 Cal. Rptr. 889, 890 (1980); see also
WITKIN, supra note 27, § 134(4) (citing cases).
32. See, e.g., Malibu Lake Mountain Club v. Smith, 18 Cal. App. 3d 31, 35, 95
Cal. Rptr. 553, 556 (1971).
33. In Malibu, the court held that such one-way fee-shifting provisions were well
established in California law and noted no public policy problems with them. Id. But
see Ecco-Phoenix, 1 Cal. 3d 266,461 P.2d 38, 81 Cal. Rptr. 849 (narrowly interpreting
a one-way fee-shifting provision to avoid an unfair result).
34. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1717(a) (West Supp. 1995).
35. Washington and Oregon have passed similar legislation. See OR. REV. STAT.
§ 20.096 (1988 & Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.84.330 (West 1988). Some
states have gone even further. Alaska has statutorily adopted the British Rule for all
cases. ALASKA R. CIV. P. § 82(a). See Gregory J. Hughes, Comment, Award of
Attorneys' Fees in Alaska: An Analysis of Rule 82, 4 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 129
(1974); Vargo, supra note 6, at 1622-26. In Arizona, the British Rule is the norm in all
contract actions. The state statute provides that, in any contested action arising out of
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The Legislature enacted section 1717 as a consumer protection law
"'intended to protect persons of limited means who sign contracts with
those in a superior bargaining position. "'36 The statute had two
interrelated goals. The first was to ensure the reciprocity of contract
provisions for attorneys' fees and that those provisions did not protect
only the party with superior bargaining power. 37 If a contract contained
a fee-shifting provision, it would henceforth apply to both parties.38
Second, the statute had the related purpose of preventing the oppressive
use of one-sided attorneys' fees provisions. Consumers as well as large
corporations should be able to vindicate their legal rights through the
legal system. 39 It was hoped that the reciprocity created by section
1717 would deter corporations from overreaching in their contracts with
consumers. 40
Although section 1717 was designed for those situations in which the
parties to the litigation were also parties to the contract, much of the
litigation over this section has involved the right of non-parties to

a contract, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party, even
if the contract does not provide for attorneys' fees. ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01
(1992).
36. Kent S. Scheidegger, Comment, Attorney's Fees and Civil Code 1717, 13
PAC. L.J. 233,236 (1981) (quoting Enrolled Bill Memorandum to Governor Reagan from
his legislative secretary, June 5, 1968 (chaptered bill file 68-AB563, California State
Archives)). Scheidegger describes this memorandum as "virtually the only available
evidence of actual legislative intent." Id.
37. One court identified this as the "sole purpose of section 1717." Associated
Convalescent Enters. v. Carl Marks & Co., Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 116, 120, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 782, 784 (1973). See also San Luis Obispo Bay Properties, Inc. v. Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co., 28 Cal. App. 3d 556, 570, 104 Cal. Rptr. 733, 743 (1972); System Inv. Corp.
v. Union Bank, 21 Cal. App. 3d 137, 163, 98 Cal. Rptr. 735, 752 (1971); CAL.
CONTINUING EDUC. OF THE.BAR, REVIEW OF SELECTED 1968 CODE LEGISLATION. 35-36
(1968) [hereinafter REVIEW].
38. System Inv. Corp., 21 Cal. App. 3d at 163, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
39. "Civil Code section 1717 is part of an overall legislative policy designed to
enable consumers and others who may be in a disadvantageous contractual bargaining
position to protect their rights through the judicial process by permitting recovery of
attorney's fees incurred in litigation in the event they prevail." Coast Bank v. Holmes,
19 Cal. App. 3d 581, 597 n.3, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30, 39 n.3 (1971).
40. Whether this goal was actually attained is debatable. One commentator has
noted that, in the wake of the passage of § 1717, parties with superior bargaining power
simply manipulate when a right to attorneys' fees is available to either party. The
consumer will still never be able to recover her fees. "The only result of the statute is
to make mass contractors more careful about when they provide for the recovery of
litigation expenses in their standard forms." W. David Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawfal
Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1975).
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recover their attorneys' fees or their liability to pay attorneys' fees
pursuant to a contractual fee-shifting provision.41 Since the enactment
of section 1717, California courts have gradually extended the ambit of
the statute to award attorneys' fees even in the absence of privity of
contract between the litigating parties. As one court remarked, "The
· repercussions of the section . . . set off sympathetic vibrations in
situations other than this straightforward one."42 This has greatly
expanded the -range of cases in which the prevailing party can recover
attorneys' fees in contract actions.
C.

Initial Case Law Applying Section 1717 to
Contractual Non-Signatories

Courts have grappled with litigants' attempts to apply section 1717 to
contractual non-signatories since shortly after the statute was enacted.
The early cases debated whether section 1717 allowed non-signatories
to recover attorneys' fees at all. 43 The first courts that addressed this
issue came to widely divergent results without any consistent rationale.
These early cases merit detailed discussion because the factual contexts
involved and the various theories raised continue to define the parameters of the debate of the applicability of section 1717 to non-signatories.
1.

Arnold v. Browne---Privity

The first appellate decision to discuss this issue was Arnold v.
Browne,44 which held that a non-signatory could not recover attorneys'

41. For a discussion of other issues raised by § 1717, see James D. Acoba,
Recovery of Attorney's Fees in Actions to Enforce Contracts: California Civil Code
Section 1717, 12 W. ST. U. L. REV. 751 (1985), discussing the issues of whether an
action is to enforce a contract and who is a prevailing party; see also Cuddy, supra note
8, discussing issues of attorneys' fees as part of an appeal bond; Scheidegger, supra note
36, discussing the statute generally.
42. Wilson's Heating & Air Cond. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1326,
1332, 249 Cal. Rptr. 553, 557 (1988).
43. See, e.g., Pas v. Hill, 87 Cal. App. 3d 521, 151 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1978), overruled
by Saucedo v. Mercury Sav. &_Loan Ass'n, 111 Cal. App. 3d 309, 168 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1980); Canal-Randolph Anaheim, Inc. v. Wilkoski, 78 Cal. App. 3d 477, 144 Cal. Rptr.
474 (1978); Care Constr. Co. v. Century Convalescent Ctrs., 54 Cal. App. 3d 701, 126
Cal. Rptr. 761 (1976); Babcock v. Omansky, 31 Cal. App. 3d 625, 107 Cal. Rptr. 512
(1973); Arnold v. Browne, 27 Cal. App. 3d 386, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1972), disapproved
by Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 25 Cal. 3d 124, 129, 599 P.2d 83, 86, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 3 (1979); Boliver v. Surety Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 22, 140 Cal. Rptr. 259
(1977); see also infra text accompanying note 62.
44. 27 Cal. App. 3d 386, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1972), disapproved by Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Alperson, 25 Cal. 3d 124, 129, 599 P.2d 83, 86, 158 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3
(1979). For a discussion of Reynolds, see the text accompanying note 67, infra.
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fees under Civil Code section 1717. In Arnold, the plaintiffs att
to recover the amount due on a promissory note from the officers
directors of thecorporate signatory of thenote, based on an alter ed
theory. The md1v1dual defendants prevailed and sought to recover their
attorneys' fees under section 1717.
The Arnold defendants based their argument for fees on ambiguity ult,
the language of the statute. At the time the case was decided, the
relevant language from Section 1717 provided as follows:
In any action on a contract, where such contract specifically provides that
attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce the provisions of such
contract, shall be awarded to one of .the parties, the prevailing party, whether
he is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable
attorney's fees in addition to costs and necessary disbursements.45

The Arnold defendants argued that the phrase "whether he is the party
specified in the contract or not" meant that any party prevailing in
litigation over a contract containing an attorneys' fees clause is entitled
to fees, regardless of whether he is a party to the contract or not.
The Arnold court rejected this argument because the language
immediately preceding this ambiguous phrase specifically refers to "one
of the parties" to the contract. The Arnold court held that only parties
to the contract could recover fees under section 1717, and so the
individual defendants could not recover their attorneys' fees. This
appears to be the proper result based on the language of the statute and
the intent of the Legislature in enacting section 1717: to make
attorneys' fees provisions reciprocal, not to extend the right to attorneys'
fees to non-parties.46 The interpretation urged by the defendants in
Arnold would have effectively overturned the American Rule in all
contract actions in which the underlying contract contained an attorneys'
fees clause, regardless of privity of contract considerations. The Arnold
court reasoned that this was not the intent of the Legislature in enacting
section 1717 .47

45. Arnold, 27 Cal. App. 3d at 397, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 783-84 (emphasis added).
The emphasized language remains essentially unchanged in the current version of the
statute.
46. See Mark A. Saxon, Recovery of Attorneys Fees by the Non-Contracting
Defendant, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 150, 151 (1980); REVIEW, supra note 37, at 35-36.
47. Arnold, 27 Cal. App. 3d at 399, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
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2.

Babcock v. Omansky - Statutory Interpretation

In Babcock v. Omansky,48 which addressed this issue only nine
months later, the court came to the opposite conclusion when faced with
nearly identical factual circumstances. Babcock also involved an attempt
to recover on promissory notes from a non-party. This time, plaintiffs
sued the obligor's wife on the theory that she was a joint venturer with
her husband. The obligor's wife prevailed and sought attorneys' fees
under section 1717. The court allowed the wife, a non-signatory, to
recover her fees based on its interpretation of the same statutory
language that had been reviewed in Arnold. The Babcock court held:
"As the language of the statute expressly indicates, a party need not be
a signatory to the contract in order to recover attorney's fees as the
prevailing party-as such prevailing party he becomes entitled to fees
'whether he is the party specified in the contract or not. "'49 The
Babcock court made no mention of Arnold, which.came to the diametrically opposite conclusion.

3. Care Construction, Inc. v. Century
Convalescent Centers, lnc - Mutuality
In Care Constr., Inc. v. Century Convalescent Ctrs., Inc., 50 the issue
arose a third time. A landlord brought an action for breach of a lease
against a putative tenant who denied the existence of the lease. The
defendant prevailed when it argued that no binding lease existed between
the parties. The court allowed the non-signatory defendant to recover its
fees based upon the novel theory of "mutuality." The court reasoned:
Here if [plaintiff] Care had been able to convince the trial court that there
was a valid lease between the parties breached by [defendant] Century, then
Care would have been able to recover attorney's fees under the lease provision.
. . . [W]e think the only way of carrying out the purpose of mutuality found in
Civil Code, § 1717, is by holding that Century is entitled to attorney's fees on
appeal. 51

Under this theory, if one party to the contract could recover fees by
prevailing, then the opposing party should also be entitled to his fees if
he should prevail, regardless of whether the parties are in privity of
contract.52 Although Care Constr. cited Babcock with approval, the

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
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31 Cal. App. 3d 625, 107 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1973).
Id. at 633, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 518.
54 Cal. App. 3d 701, 126 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1976).
Id. at 705, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 763.
Mutuality theory is discussed in detail infra text accompanying notes 108-44.
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Care Constr. court did not look to the language of the statute to reach
its conclusion, as did Babcock
4.

Canal-Randolph Anaheim, Inc. v. Wilkoski-Reprise of Privity

The direct conflict between Babcock, Arnold, and Care Constr.
remained unaddressed and unresolved by the appellate courts until
1978,53 when the tension between these cases was finally discussed in
Canal-Randolph Anaheim, Inc. v. Wilkoski. 54 In Canal-Randolph,
plaintiff was a lessor of real property. Defendant was a former
employee of the original lessee who started making the lease payments
after the original tenancy dissolved. Defendant was neither the successor
to, nor a sub-tenant of, the original tenant, so there was no contractual
relationship between the parties. Plaintiff brought an unlawful detainer
action against the new tenant. The non-signatory defendant prevailed
and sought attorneys' fees pursuant to section 1717.
The Canal-Randolph court flatly rejected the argument accepted in
Babcock that the ambiguous language of Section 1717 provided for
attorneys' fees awards in favor of prevailing non-parties.55 The Cana/Randolph court instead agreed with Arnold that the meaning of the
phrase in section 1717, "whether he is the party specified in the contract
or not,"56 refers solely to the "party to the contract who prevails."57
53. A San Luis Obispo Superior Court, Appellate Department, did address this
issue without attempting to resolve it. Boliver v. Surety Co., 72 .Cal. App. 3d Supp. 22,
140 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1977). When asked to award attorneys' fees against a surety not in
privity of contract with plaintiff on the relevant contract, the Boliver court cited both
Babcock and Arnold with approval without attempting to explain the inconsistency
between them. The Boliver court referred to the decision in Babcock as an "extension"
of the rule in Arnold. Id. at 29, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 263. The Boliver court limited
Babcock to its facts of a co-venturer, agent, or partner sued on a contract as if it were
a party to the contract. The court held that it would not "further expand the benefits of
Civil Code section 1717" beyond the factual situation of Babcock. Id. at 29, 140 Cal.
Rptr. at 264.
54. 78 Cal. App. 3d 477, 144 Cal. Rptr. 474 (1978).
55. The same court, Division Two of the Fourth District Court of Appeals, decided
both Canal-Randolph and Care Constr.. Faced with having approved of Babcock in
Care Constr. in 1976, the Canal-Randolph court in 1978 expressly rejected that decision,
saying that "our citation of Babcock v. Omansky for additional support was both
improvident and unnecessary to the decision. Accordingly, that portion of the opinion
in [Care Constr. Inc.] citing Babcock v. Omansky as additional support is disapproved."
Canal-Randolph, 78 Cal. App. 3d at 496, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 477 (citations omitted).
56. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1717 (West Supp. 1995).
51. Canal-Randolph, 78 Cal. App. 3d at 496, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77.
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The Canal-Randolph court then looked to the purpose of section 1717
to interpret it. The court reasoned that the statute was designed solely
to make attorneys' fees provisions reciprocal for parties to the contract
and therefore did not extend that right to non-parties. Like Arnold,
Canal-Randolph held that a non-signatory could not be liable for
attorneys' fees under a contract and that privity of contract was a
requirement for application of Civil Code section 1717.
5.

Pas v. Hill-Estoppel

The broad holding of Canal-Randolph did not last very long. The
same judicial panel drastically retreated from that decision less than a
year later in Pas v. Hill. 58 In Pas, the defendant sold real property and
received a promissory note secured by a deed of trust from the
purchaser. The purchaser sold the property to plaintiff, who did not
assume the promissory note or the deed of trust, although she continued
to make payments due on the note. When defendant attempted to
enforce the note's due-on-sale clause, plaintiff brought suit to enjoin
defendant from foreclosing on the deed of trust. Plaintiff prevailed and
sought attorneys' fees based on section 1717.
Pas extensively analyzed the issue and held that plaintiff was not
entitled to attorneys' fees. The court did not base its decision on the
privity arguments used in Arnold and Canal-Randolph. Instead, the Pas
court first reiterated its interpretation of section 1717 as set forth in
Canal-Randolph, that neither the express language nor the legislative
intent of the statute could support an award of attorneys' fees to nonsignatories. Inexplicably, the Pas court then went well beyond the facts
before it and reversed its own broad holding in Canal-Randolph. In
dicta the court stated that "it is not necessary to be a signatory to the
contract to recover attorney fees under section 1717."59 The Pas court
agreed with the specific holding of Babcock that where a signatory
plaintiff attempts to prove a non-signatory defendant's liability on a
contract containing an attorneys' fees clause, and the latter prevails, she
may recover fees under the contract. The Pas court explained it as a
matter of estoppel:
[T]he plaintiffs having alleged and attempted to prove the defendant wife was
a party to the notes as a joint venturer and that she was liable under the notes'
attorney fee provisions and having caused defendant wife to defend against such

58. 87 Cal. App. 3d 521, 151 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1978), overruled by Saucedo v.
Mercury Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 111 Cal. App. 3d 309, 315, 168 Cal. Rptr. 552, 555-56
(1980). For a discussion of Saucedo, see the text accompanying notes 123-29, infra.
59. Id. at 534, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
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liability, were estopped to deny defendant wife was a party to the contract for
the remedial purposes of Civil Code section 1717. 60

According to this theory, the mere allegation in a litigant's pleading of
the other party's liability for fees pursuant to a contract estops the
former from.denying her own liability for fees if she loses. 61 The court
concluded that the facts in the case before it did not implicate estoppel
principles and so refused to award fees.
· In sum, in the first ten years after the Legislature enacted section
1717, five appellate decisions62 addressed the question of the ability of
non-parties to recover attorneys' fees as prevailing parties under section
1717, and came up with four different holdings: Arnold and Cana/Randolph held that privity of contract between the parties to the
litigation was always required for an award of fees. Babcock held that
a prevailing party could always recover fees, whether a party to the
underlying contract or not. Care Constr. held that a non-signatory could
sometimes recover fees in accordance with the principle of "mutuality"
of section 1717. Finally, Pas held that a non-signatory could recover
fees in accordance with the principle of estoppel.
D. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson - TheSupreme Court
· Affirms Fee-Shifting For Contractual Non-Signatories
Under Section 1717

This issue came before the California Supreme Court in 1979 in
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson. 63 In Reynolds, plaintiff sought to
enforce the terms of a promissory note against non-signatory shareholders and directors of the corporation that had executed the note, on a
theory of alter ego liability. The corporation executing the note had
filed for bankruptcy and was not a party to the case. The non-signatory
defendants prevailed and sought attorneys' fees under section 1717.
The supreme court decided the question of the applicability of section
1717 to non-signatories in extremely summary fashion, without any
detailed analysis. First, as the courts in Arnold, Babcock, and Canal-

60. Id. at 535-36, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 108 (citations omitted).
61. Estoppel theory is discussed in detail infra text accompanying notes 92-107.
62. One judge decided three of these cases: Judge Kaufman of Division Two of
the Fourth District Court of Appeals decided Canal-Randolph, Care Constr., and Pas.
For further discussion, see supra notes 55 and 58.
63. 25 Cal. 3d 124, 599 P.2d 83, 158 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1979).
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Randolph had done, the Reynolds court looked to the language of the
statute,64 which it found ambiguous:
The language of the statute is unclear as to whether it shall be applied to
litigants who like defendants have not signed the contract. The section refers
to "any action on a contract" thus including any action where it is alleged that
a person is liable on a contract, whether or not the court concludes he is a party
to that contract. Nevertheless the terms "parties" and "party" are ambiguous ..
It is unclear whether the Legislature used the terms to refer to signatories or to
litigants. 65
·

Because the language of the statute was unclear, the court then looked
to the statute's legislative intent, which it determined was:. (1) to make
attorneys' fees clauses reciprocal, and (2) to prevent oppressive 1:1se of
one-sided attorneys' fees provisions. Based on this legislative intent, the
court reasoned:
.

.

Its purposes require section 1717 be interpreted to further provide a
reciprocal remedy for a nonsignatory defendant, sued on a contract as if he
were a party to it, when a plaintiff would clearly be entitled to attorney's fees
should he prevail in enforcing the contractual obligation ·against the defendant. 66

Reynolds then cited Babcock, Pas, Canal-Randolph, and Boliver with
approval, and disapproved of Arnold. The court concluded that the nonsignatory defendant could recover fees, reasoning: "Had plaintiff
prevailed on its [contract] cause of action ... , defendants would have
been liable on the notes. Since they would have been liable for
attorney's fees pursuant to the fees provision had plaintiff prevailed, they
may recover attorneys' fees pursuant to section 1717 now that they have
prevailed."67 Reynolds thus established that a contractual non-signatory
may, in some cases, recover attorneys' fees as the prevailing party in a
contract action pursuant to section 1717.
Reynolds also created a two-part test for determining when a
contractual non-signatory may recover fees under section 1717. First,
the non-signatory must be "sued on a contract as if he were a party to
it."68 Second, the signatory party must "clearly be entitled to attorneys'
fees should he prevail in enforcing the contractual obligation against the
[non-signatory]."69 The first part of this test is relatively
uncontroversial. Courts have uniformly held that any cause of action or

64.
ing note
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
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For the text of § 1717 at the time of this decision, see supra text accompany34.
Reynolds, 25 Cal. 3d at 128, 599 P.2d at 85, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 129, 599 P.2d at 86, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 3 (citation omitted).
Id. at 128, 599 P.2d at 85, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
Id.
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defense related to a contract, such as an alter ego claim or a third party
beneficiary claim, are actions on a contract.70 The second part of this
test has created most of the uncertainty for non-signatories seeking fees.
It is unclear what it means to be "clearly entitled to fees," or when and
how this determination is to be made. Furthermore, the summary
manner in: which the Reynolds court addressed this issue left later courts
with few clues as to how to resolve those unanswered questions.
In sum, Reynolds left more questions open than it resolved. The court
did riot establish any clear legal standard for applying Civil Code section
1717 to non-signatories. In addition, because Reynolds formally
endorsed Babcock, Care Constr., and Pas, without distinguishing
between their differing rationales,71 later courts were forced to choose
between the two possible theoretical bases provided by these earlier
decisions to fashion their own rules for applying section 1717.
II. THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 1717 TO CONTRACTUAL
NON-SIGNATORIES AFTER REYNOLDS: CASES AND THEORIES
.
.

Reynolds' failure to elaborate any rationale for its decision spawned
intense litigation over the application of section 1717 to factual situations
differing from that presented in Reynolds. Reynolds established only that
a prevailing non-signatory defendant can recover attorneys' fees from a
losing signatory plaintiff. Since Reynolds, litigation about the applica-

areas

70. However,
of dispute exist as to whether non-contractual causes of action
arise out of a contract, thus creating a right to fees under § 1717. See, e.g., Shadoan v.
World Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 219 Cal. App. 3d 97, 101, 268 Cal. Rptr. 207, 208 (1990)
(holding that an action alleging unfair business practices under Business & Professions
Code § 17200 that arises out of a contract is an action "on the contract," while an action
for fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract is not an action "on the contract"); Star
Pac. Inv., Inc. v. Oro Hills Ranch, Inc., 121 Cal. App. 3d 447, 460, 176 Cal. Rptr. 546,
553 (1981) (for purposes of§ 1717, an action for rescission is "on a contract");
Schlocker v. Schlocker, 62 Cal. App. 3d 921, 133 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1976) (same scenario
as Shadoan); see also Glynn v. Marquette, 152 Cal. App. 3d 277, 199 Cal. Rptr. 306
.(1984) (cause of action for sp(leific performance of contract against non-signatory
pursuant to CAL. Civ. CODE § 3395 does not create right to fees under § 1717); cf
Lerner v. Ward, 13 Cal. App. 4th 155, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486 (1993) (contractual
attorneys' fees are available in actions for fraudulent inducement to enter contract
pursuant to CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021). See generally Acoba, supra note 41, at
754-56.
71. One appellate court noted this inconsistency and remarked that the holdings
of Canal-Randolph and Babcock "appear irreconcilable." Manier v. Anaheim Business
Ctr. Co., 161 Cal. App. 3d 503, 507 n.4, 207 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511 n.4 (1984).
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tion of Civil Code section 1717 has expanded to include every possible
combination of prevailing parties and signatories to a contract: a
prevailing signatory defendant's ability to recover fees from a losing
non-signatory plaintiff,72 a prevailing signatory plaintiff's ability to
recover fees from a losing non-signatory defendant, 73 and a prevailing
non-signatory plaintiff's ability to recover fees from a losing signatory
defendant. 74
Although many courts have categorized and examined these cases
according to the plaintiff/defendant and party/non-party distinctions
outlined above,75 this approach is of very limited utility. These
categories are so manipulable that no consistent results can be predicted
based on them. 76 Furthermore, courts have grante9 and disapproved of
fees in all of the possible combinations.77 A more incisive approach
to this issue analyzes the types of cases involving contractual non-

72. See, e.g., Real Property Servs. Corp. v. City of Pasadena, 25 Cal. App. 4th
375, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536 (1994) (fees awarded); Brusso v. Running Springs Country
Club, Inc., 228 Cal. App. 3d 92, 108-11, 278 Cal. Rptr. 758, 766-68 (1991) (fees
awarded); Leach v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 185 Cal. App. 3d 1295, 1304-07, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 553, 559-61 (1986) (fees not awarded); Manier, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 508,207 Cal.
Rptr. at 511-12 (fees awarded); Jones v. Drain, 149 Cal. App. 3d 484, 196 Cal. Rptr. 827
(1983) (fees awarded).
73. See, e.g., Wilson's Heating & Air Cond. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 202 Cal. App.
3d 1326, 249 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1988) (fees not awarded); Glynn v. Marquette, 152 Cal.
App. 3d 277, 199 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1984) (fees not awarded). But see Lewis v. Alpha
Beta Co., 141 Cal. App. 3d 29, 33, 189 Cal. Rptr. 840, 842 (1983) (fees awarded).
74. See, e.g., Pilcher v. Wheeler, 2 Cal. App. 4th 352, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533 (1992)
(fees not awarded). But see Steve Schmidt & Co. v. Berry, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1299, 228
Cal. Rptr. 689 (1986) (fees awarded); Wilhite v, Callihan, 135 Cal. App. 3d 295, 301-02,
185 Cal. Rptr. 215, 218-19 (1982) (fees awarded); Saucedo v. Mercury Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 111 Cal. App. 3d 309, 168 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1980) (fees awarded); In re Vista
Medical Investors, Ltd., 98 B.R. 29 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989) (fees awarded).
75. See, e.g., Real Property Servs., 25 Cal. App. 4th at 380-82, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 539-41; Wilson's Heating, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1333 nn.6-7, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 557 n.6,
558 n.7; Leach, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 1306, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 560-61.
76. For example, a party who is a defendant in one case could be a plaintiff in
another case involving the same fact pattern merely by initiating the action and seeking
declaratory or injunctive relief. See Star Pac. Inv., Inc. v. Oro Hills Ranch, 121 Cal.
App. 3d 447,460, 176 Cal. Rptr. 546, 553 (1981) (noting that the nominal "plaintiff'
may in some cases file suit as a "defensive response" to the nominal defendant's extrajudicial actions). Compare Pas v. Hill, 87 Cal. App. 3d 521, 151 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1978)
(plaintiff was a non-assuming grantee under a deed of trust that sought declaratory relief
and an injunction to prevent defendant, the lender under the deed of trust, from enforcing
a due-on-sale clause), overruled by Saucedo v. Mercury Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 111 Cal.
App. 3d 309, 315, 168 Cal. Rptr. 552, 555-56 (1980), with Santa Clara Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Pereira, 164 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 211 Cal. Rptr. 54 (1985) (plaintiff was the
lender under the deed of trust who brought an action against the original trustor and the
non-assuming grantee of the subject property, seeking to enforce the due-on-sale clause
of the underlying note).
11. See cases cited supra notes 72-74.
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signatories in which courts have shifted attorneys' fees and the theories
used to justify sucI?- fee-shifting.
·
A.

Current Application of Section 1717 to Contractual
Non-Signatories

Litigants in contract actions who are not signatories to the contract in
dispute have received or been liable ·for attorneys' fees pursuant to
section 1717 in four broad types of cases. In the first situation, a
signatory to a contract with an attorneys' fees clause sues a nonsignatory alleging the non-signatory's liability under an alter ego,
If the non-signatory
conspiracy, co-venturer, or similar theory.
defendant prevails, the court may award her fees under section 1717.
The courts analyzed this factual situation in Reynolds,78 Arnold,79 and
Babcock,80 and in several other reported cases. 81
In the second common situation, a party asserts the existence of a
contract later found unenforceable. If the alleged contract contained an
attorneys' fees clause, courts have granted fees pursuant to section 1717
to the party denying enforceability. The Manier v. Anaheim Business
Ctr. Co. 82 court allowed fee-shifting under section 1717 when the
contract was found unenforceable because plaintiffs had added additional
terms that were never accepted by defendants. The non-signatory
defendants recovered their attorneys' fees despite the lack of an
enforceable contract between the parties. This closely paralleled the
factual situation found in Care Constr. 83 and several other cases. 84
78. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 25 Cal. 3d 124, 599 P.2d 83, 158 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1979).
79. Arnold v. Browne, 27 Cal. App. 3d 386, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1972),
disapproved by Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 25 Cal. 3d 124, 129,599 P.2d 83, 86,
158 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1979).
80. Babcock v. Omansky, 31 Cal. App. 3d 625, 107 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1973).
81. See, e.g., Walsh v. New W. Fed. Sav. & Loan, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1539, 1542,
1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 35, 37 (1991); Southern Cal. Pipe Trades Dist. Council No. 16 v. Merritt,
126 Cal. App. 3d 530, 541, 179 Cal. Rptr. 794, 801 (1981).
82. 161 Cal. App. 3d 503, 207 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1981)..
83. Care Constr., Inc. v. Century Convalescent Ctrs., Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d 701,
126 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1976), discussed supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
84. See, e.g., Hsu v. Abbara, 9 Cal. 4th 863, 866-68, 891 P.2d 804, 806-07, 39
Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 826-27 (1995); Balistreri v. Nevada Livestock Prod. Credit Ass'n, 214
Cal. App. 3d 635, 644, 262 Cal. Rptr. 862, 866-67 (1989); North Assocs. v. Bell, 184
Cal. App. 3d 860, 865, 229 Cal. Rptr. 305, 308-09 (1986); Manier v. Anaheim Business
Ctr. Co., 161 Cal. App. 3d 503, 508, 207 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511-12 (1984).
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In the third type of case in which litigants commonly invoke section
1717 to award fees vis-a-vis non-signatories, a non-signatory third party
beneficiary to a contract containing an attorneys' fees clause sues a
signatory on the contract. Typically, a sub-tenant sues the master
landlord on the master lease,85 or a real estate agent sues the parties to
a real property purchase and sale agreement whom the agent served as
broker. 86 In both of these examples, the plaintiff is a known third party
beneficiary of the contract suing to enforce his rights under the contract.
The fourth general category involves a non-assuming grantee of real
property encumbered by a pre-existing deed of trust. 87 The nonassuming grantee and the trustee are not in privity of contract because
the non-assuming grantee is not a party to the deed of trust or the
promissory note. 88 Some courts have held that if the trustee seeks to
judicially enforce the deed of trust, or the non-assuming grantee sues to
enjoin the trustee from doing so, the prevailing party may recover fees
under section 1717. Pas was the first case to discuss this scenario.
While Pas refused to award fees, many cases since then have granted
fees in this situation. 89
In addition to these four categories, fees have been awarded in other
situations based on the equities of the individual case. For example, one
court made an equitable fee-shifting rule reciprocal on the basis of
section 1717 when a contract was involved in the underlying dispute. 90
In this case, no contract was even in dispute between the parties to the

85. See, e.g., Real Property Servs. Corp. v. City of Pasadena, 25 Cal. App. 4th
375, 382-84, 30 Cal. Rptr. 536, 540-42 (1994) (subtenant was the losing third party
beneficiary/plaintiff who was held liable for fees); cf In re Vista Medical Investors,
Ltd., 98 B.R. 29, 34 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989) (subtenant was prevailing third party
beneficiary/plaintiff who recovered fees).
86. See, e.g., Steve Schmidt & Co. v. Berry, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1299, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 689 (1986) (prevailing third party beneficiary/plaintiff recovers fees); cf Jones v.
Drain, 149 Cal. App. 3d 484, 487-88, 196 Cal. Rptr. 827, 829-30 (1983) (losing third
party beneficiary/plaintiff held liable for fees).
87. A "non-assuming grantee" is a party who acquires real property encumbered
by a pre-existing senior lien, but does not contractually assume the obligations of that
senior encumbrance. See generally ROGER BERNHARDT, CALIFORNIA MORTGAGE AND
DEED OF TRUST PRACTICE§ 8.21 (2d ed. 1990).
88. See Braun v. Crew, 183 Cal. 728, 192 P. 531 (1920).
89. See, e.g., Santa Clara Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Pereira, 164 Cal. App. 3d 1089,
1098, 211 Cal. Rptr. 54, 59 (1985) (non-assuming grantee held liable for fees); cf
Wilhite v. Callihan, 135 Cal. App. 3d 295, 301-02, 185 Cal. Rptr. 215,219 (1982) (nonassuming grantee recovered fees); Saucedo v. Mercury Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 111 Cal.
App. 3d 309, 315, 168 Cal. Rptr. 552, 555-56 (1980) (same). But see Smith v. Kreuger,
150 Cal. App. 3d 752, 757, 198 Cal. Rptr. 174, 176 (1983) (applying same principle to
allow original trustors under deed of trust to recover fees); Valley Bible Ctr. v. Western
Title Ins. Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 932, 933, 188 Cal. Rptr. 335, 336 (1983) (same).
90. See Brusso v. Running Springs Country Club, Inc., 228 Cal. App. 3d 92, 278
Cal. Rptr. 758 (1991).
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action. In a second example not fitting into any category, the signatories
to a lease sued the adjoining lessee, a signatory to a similar lease with
the same landlord. 91 There was no privity of contract between plaintiffs and defendant, but the former were suing to enforce a non-compete
clause in their own lease that benefitted the latter. Defendant was thus
a non-signatory third party beneficiary of the contract. Plaintiffs
prevailed and recovered their attorneys' fees from defendant pursuant to
an attorneys' fees clause in both leases.

B.

Theoretical Justifications

Courts have used two theories to justify fee-shifting under section
1717 in cases involving contractual non-signatories: estoppel theory and
mutuality theory. While these theories will often produce the same
result, important differences generate differing outcomes under certain
circumstances.

1.

Estoppel Theory

Estoppel theory applies general estoppel principles to section 1717.
Under the general rule of estoppel, a party may not deny a fact he has
represented to the other side as true when that representation would yield
an unfair or unjust result. 92 This principle applies to section 1717
when a party, claiming a right to attorneys' fees pursuant to a contractual provision, is estopped from denying the other party's right to recover
attorneys' fees if the other party prevails. 93 As one court proverbially
put it, "Under Civil Code Section 1717, what is sauce for the goose is
sauce for the gander . . . ." 94
Courts have used two arguments to justify applying estoppel principles
to section 1717. First, they have relied on the equitable purposes of the
statute. Section 1717 was intended to remedy unfair and unequal

91. Lewis v. Alpha Beta Co., 141 Cal. App. 3d 29, 189 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1983).
92. See 11 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 176 (9th ed. 1990).
See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1589 {West 1982); CAL CIV. CODE § 3521 {West 1970 &
Supp. 1995); CAL. EVID. CODE§ 623 {West 1966).
93. See Manier v. Anaheim Business Ctr. Co., 161 Cal. App. 3d 503, 508, 207
Cal. Rptr. 508, 511 (1984); Jones v. Drain, 149 Cal. App. 3d 484, 490, 196 Cal. Rptr.
827, 831 (1983).
94. Valley Bible Ctr. v. Western Title Ins. Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 932, 933, 188
Cal. Rptr. 335, 336 (1983).
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attorneys' fees provisions by making them reciprocal. 95 Courts have
reasoned that this goal of reciprocity should be broadly extended to
parties not in privity of contract on the basis of equity. 96 Courts
addressing other aspects of Section 1717 have consistently held that
equitable principles govern the statute. 97 Indeed, California courts have
generally construed contractual attorneys' fees clauses liberally. 98
Second, the language of Reynolds supports estoppel theory.
Reynolds s approval of Pas, which first articulated the application of
estoppel principles to section 1717, certainly lends credibility to the
theory. In addition, Reynolds s failure to explain the theoretical basis for
its decision created a doctrinal vacuum for later courts to fill. The
Reynolds court held only that, when a signatory party is "clearly
entitled" to recover fees if she should prevail, then a non-signatory is
also entitled to recover her fees. Reynolds left an important question
unanswered: What does it mean to be "clearly {?ntitled" to attorneys'
fees? Courts espousing estoppel theory answered this question in the
most inclusive way possible: a party becomes "clearly entitled" to fees
by simply alleging an entitlement to them. Under estoppel theory, the
determination of the "clarity of entitlement" to attorneys' fees is based
on the parties' allegations and not on the facts that are ultimately proven
at trial. 99 The allegation need not even be made in the pleadings, as
long as the claim to attorneys' fees is asserted during trial. 100
Under estoppel theory, the fact that a party's allegation of entitlement
is baseless or unfounded is irrelevant. Plaintiff does not need a realistic
possibility of prevailing on a contract claim for a prevailing nonsignatory defendant to recover attorneys' fees. 101 One court awarded
attorneys' fees to the prevailing defendant "even though the [plaintiff]
possessed no evidence to support its cause of action" and plaintiff's

95. See supra note 37.
96. See North Assocs. v. Bell, 184 Cal. App. 3d 860, 865, 229 Cal. Rptr. 305, 30809 (1986); Jones, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 489, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
97. See, e.g., International Indus., Inc. v. Olen, 21 Cal. 3d 218, 223-224, 577 P.2d
1031, 1034, 145 Cal. Rptr. 691, 693-94 (1978); Bank ofldaho v. Pine Ave. Assocs., 137
Cal. App. 3d 5, 16-17, 186 Cal. Rptr. 695, 703 (1982).
98. See, e.g., Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp. v. Howard J. White, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 266,
272, 461 P.2d 33, 36, 81 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1969).
99. See Manier v. Anaheim Business Ctr. Co., 161 Cal. App. 3d 503,508,207 Cal.
Rptr. 508, 511 (1984); Jones, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 487, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
100. See Walsh v. New W. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1539, 1547,
1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 35, 40 (1991); Montgomery v. Bio-Med Specialties, Inc., 183 Cal. App.
3d 1292, 1296, 228 Cal. Rptr. 709, 711 (1986). .
101. North Assocs. v. Bell, 184 Cal. App. 3d 860,865,229 Cal. Rptr. 305, 308-09
(1986); Jones, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 488-89, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 830-31.
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claim "was so devoid of merit that there was no possibility that it ever
could have prevailed."102 Another court held:
·
As long as an action "involves" a contract, and one of the parties would be
entitled to recover attorney fees under the contract if that party prevails in its
lawsuit, the other party should also be entitled to attorney fees if it prevails,
even if it does so by successfully arguing the inagplicability, invalidity,
unenforceability, or nonexistence of the same contract 1

Courts have. relied on estoppel theory to allow a prevailing nonsignatory to recover attorneys' fees in a variety of cases, including
claims by a non-signatory third party beneficiary, 104 claims based on
unenforceable contracts, 105 and claims against a contractual nonsignatory who allegedly is an obligor on the contract. 106 Estoppel
theory has not served as a basis to award fees in cases involving nonassuming grantees. 107

2.

Mutuality Theory

Mutuality is the other theory courts have used to support awards of
attorneys' fees to non-signatories under section 1717. Mutuality differs
from estoppel in that the prevailing party is entitled to fees only if the
losing party would actually have been entitled to recover fees had the
losing party prevailed. The mere allegation of an entitlement to fees is
not sufficient.
The Reynolds holding provides the main support for mutuality
theory. 108 This reliance is odd considering that Reynolds did riot even
cite Care Constr., the case originating mutuality theory, but did

102. Jones, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 488-89, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 830-31.
103. North Assocs., 184 Cal. App. 3d at 865, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
104. See, e.g., Steve Schmidt & Co. v. Berry, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1299, 1314-17, 228
Cal. Rptr. 689, 698-700 (1986); Jones, 149 Cal. App. 3d 484, 196 Cal. Rptr. 827.
105. See, e.g., North Assocs., 184 Cal. App. 3d 860, 229 Cal. Rptr. 305; Manier v.
Anaheim Business Ctr. Co., 161 Cal. App. 3d 503, 207 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1984).
106. See, e.g., Walsh v. New W. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1539,
1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 35 (1991).
107. Pas applied estoppel theory to the non-assuming grantee situation and declined
to award fees. Pas v. Hill, 87 Cal. App. 3d 521, 151 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1978), overruled by
Saucedo v. Mercury Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 111 Cal. App. 3d 309, 315, 168 Cal. Rptr. 552,
555-56 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
108. See, e.g., Hsu v. Abbara, 9 Cal. 4th 863, 870, 891 P.2d 804, 809, 39 Cal. Rptr.
2d 824, 829 (1995) (California Supreme Court stated in dicta that Reynolds supported
mutuality theory).
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specifically approve of Pas, which originated estoppel theory. 109
Mutuality theory is based on the same language in Reynolds as estoppel
theory. The key phrase in Reynolds is the requirement that the losing
party "would clearly be entitled to attorneys' fees should he prevail in
enforcing the contractual obligation" against the prevailing party. 110
When using mutuality theory, subsequent courts interpreted this phrase
to mean that ''the party claiming a right to receive fees [must] establish
that the opposing party actually would have been entitled to receive
them if he or she had been the prevailing party. "111 But Reynolds
contains no such language or holding to this effect. 112 Reynolds does
not require an actual entitlement to recover fees on the part of the losing
party. In fact, mutuality theory simply relies on a different determination than estoppel theory as to what stage of the litigation to use to
determine when the entitlement to fees becomes clear. 113 Under
mutuality theory, courts opt for the proof stage; 114 under estoppel
theory, courts choose the pleadings stage. 115
In order to determine if the prevailing party is entitled to recover
attorneys' fees using mutuality theory, courts must first determine
whether the losing party could have successfully established a right to
recover attorneys' fees under the facts of the case as proven. This may
require a detailed analysis of the losing party's case, including the
party's legal theories and factual claims. Only if the losing party could
actually have recovered attorneys' fees will the court grant attorneys'
fees to the prevailing party. Mutuality theory thus requires a counterfactual or "backward" analysis. 116

109. Many courts espousing mutuality theory have criticized estoppel theory as a
misreading of Reynolds. See Real Property Servs. Corp. v. City of Pasadena, 25 Cal.
App. 4th 375, 382 n.5, 30 Cal. Rptr. 536, 540 n.5 (1994); Super 7 Motel Assocs. v.
Wang, 16 Cal. App. 4th 541, 548-49, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 197 (1993); Wilson's
Heating & Air Cond. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1326, 1333 n.7, 249 Cal.
Rptr. 553, 557 n.7 (1988); Leach v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 185 Cal. App. 3d 1295,
1306-07, 230 Cal. Rptr. 553, 560-61 (1986).
110. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 25 Cal. 3d 124, 128, 599 P.2d 83, 85, 158
Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1979).
111. Real Property Servs., 25 Cal. App. 4th at 382, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 540; Super 7,
16 Cal. App. 4th at 549, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 540; Leach, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 1307, 230
Cal. Rptr. at 561.
112. Reynolds, 25 Cal. 3d at 128, 599 P.2d at 85, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
113. Jones v. Drain, 149 Cal. App. 3d 484, 487, 196 Cal. Rptr. 827, 829 (1983).
114. See, e.g., Leach, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 1307, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
115. See, e.g., Manier v. Anaheim Business Ctr. Co., 161 Cal. App. 3d 503, 508,
207 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511 (1984).
116. Although not termed counter-factual by the court, the process is discussed in
Real Property Servs. Corp. v. City of Pasadena, 25 Cal. App. 4th 375, 382-83, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 536, 540-41 (1994); see also Super 7 Motel Assocs. v. Wang, 16 Cal. App. 4th
541, 549-50, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 199-200 (1993); Artesia Medical Dev. Co. v.
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Courts following mutuality theory often apply the test very broadly,
in order to award fees equitably. Courts have gone to extraordinary
lengths to find that the losing party had a possibility of recovering
attorneys' fees if it had rirevailed, so that the prevailing party can
recover its attorneys' fees. 17 Mutuality theory would provide for fees
in each of the four factual situations described above: the alter ego
claim, the unenforceable contract claim, the third party beneficiary claim,
and the non-assuming grantee situation. 118
Mutuality theory would allow fee-shifting under the first type of case,
where a signatory alleges that a non-signatory is liable on a contract
under an alter-ego or similar type theory. If the losing party had
prevailed, it would have recovered its attorneys' fees. Therefore, the
prevailing party can recover attorneys' fees.11 9
Mutuality theory also allows fee-shifting in the second type of case,
where a contractual non-signatory defendant prevails on the contract
claim by showing that the alleged contract is unenforceable. 120
Mutuality only requires the mere possibility that the losing party could
prevail and recover attorneys' fees under a contractual provision. Only
if the losing party could not recover fees under any circumstances will
the court deny fees to the prevailing party under mutuality theory. 121

Regency Assocs., Ltd., 214 Cal. App. 3d 957, 962-64, 266 Cal. Rptr. 657, 659-60
(1989); Alhambra Redev. Agency v. Transamerica Fin. Servs., 212 Cal. App. 3d 1370,
1381, 261 Cal. Rptr. 248, 253-54 (1989).
117. See, e.g., Saucedo v. Mercury Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Ill Cal. App. 3d 309, 168
Cal. Rptr. 552 (1980), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 123-29; see also
Brusso v. Running Springs Country Club, Inc., 228 Cal. App. 3d 92,278 Cal. Rptr. 758
(1991), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 131-35; cases cited infra at notes
138-43 and accompanying text.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 78-89.
119. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Pipe Trades Dist. Council No. 16 v. Merritt, 126 Cal.
App. 3d 530,541, 179 Cal. Rptr. 794, 801 (1981).
120. Indeed, the seminal mutuality theory case involved a non-signatory party who
prevailed by proving that no enforceable agreement existed between the parties. Care
Constr., Inc. v. Century Convalescent Ctrs., Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d 701, 707, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 761, 765 (1976) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 50-52); see also Hsu
v. Abbara, 9 Cal. 4th 863, 891 P.2d 804, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824 (1995); Balistreri v.
Nevada Livestock Prod. Credit Ass'n, 214 Cal. App. 3d 635, 644, 262 Cal. Rptr. 862,
866-67 (1989); Berge v. International Harvester Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d 152, 164, 190
Cal. Rptr. 815, 823-24 (1983).
121. See Artesia Medical· Dev. Co. v. Regency Assocs., Ltd., 214 Cal. App. 3d 957,
962-64, 266 Cal. Rptr. 657, 659-60 (1989); Alhambra Redev. Agency v. Transamerica
Fin. Servs., 212 Cal. App. 3d 1370, 1381, 261 Cal. Rptr. 248, 253-54 (1989).
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Mutuality theory also provides for fee-shifting in some cases involving
third party beneficiaries suing to enforce their rights under a contract.
The third party beneficiary's right to recover fees depends upon the
court's interpretation of liability for such fees if he had lost. Authority
is split on this question. 122
The non-assuming grantee situation demonstrates the broad application
of mutuality theory in awarding fees to a non-signatory. The first court
to apply mutuality theory to this factual scenario was Saucedo v.
Mercury Sav. & Loan Ass 'n. 123 The Saucedo court first looked at the
losing party's right to recover its fees if it had prevailed. Under existing
case law, a prevailing trustee cannot recover its fees based on the
attorneys' fees clause of the deed of trust because the non-assuming
grantees were not parties to the contract. 124 Thus, the non-assuming
grantees should not recover their fees under mutuality principle because
the non-assuming grantees could not be liable to the trustee for its fees
if the trustee had prevailed. 125 On further analysis, however, the
Saucedo court found that, "as a practical matter," the trustee could have
recovered its fees if the trustee had prevailed and gone forward with the
foreclosure. 126 The only way for the purchasers to retain their equity
in the property would be to pay off the secured debt. 127 This would
include the trustee's attorneys' fees which would be added to the
principal amount of the debt pursuant to the deed of trust. 128
One commentator explained: "[A]s a practical matter, on foreclosure
the beneficiary is entitled to recover her fees as a condition to redemp-

122. Compare In re Vista Medical Investors, Ltd., 98 B.R. 29, 34 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1989) (third party beneficiary can recover attorneys' fees); Real Property Servs. Corp.
v. City of Pasadena, 25 Cal. App. 4th 375, 383-84, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536, 541-42 (1994)
(same) with Super 7 Motel Assocs. v. Wang, 16 Cal. App. 4th 541, 546, 20 Cal. Rptr.
2d 193, 197 (1993) (third party beneficiary cannot recover attorneys' fees). For a
discussion of this conflict, see infra text accompanying notes 200-11.
123. 111 Cal. App. 3d 309, 168 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1980). Judge Kaufman, who
decided Pas as well as Care Constr. and Canal-Randolph, also wrote the Saucedo
opinion. See also Smith v. Kreuger, 150 Cal. App. 3d 752,757, 198 Cal. Rptr. 174,176
(1983) (addressing the related situation of an award of attorneys' fees in a suit by the
original trustor of the deed of trust suing to enjoin the trustee from enforcing the due-onsale clause); Wilhite v. Callihan, 135 Cal. App. 3d 295, 301-02, 185 Cal. Rptr. 215,219
(1982) (non-assuming grantee recovered fees, following Saucedo).
124. Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 15 Cal. 3d 590, 596-97, 542 P.2d 981, 985-86, 125
Cal. Rptr. 557, 561-62 (1975) (holding that a non-assuming grantee is not personally
liable for obligations created by the pre-existing note and deed of trust).
125. As set forth supra in text accompanying notes 111-16, under mutuality, courts
will only award fees to the prevailing party if the losing party had a possibility of
recovering her fees if she had prevailed.
126. Saucedo, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 314, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 315, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 555-56.
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tion and if the non-assuming grantee wishes to protect his equity in the
property he will have to pay those fees. " 1 9 The non-assuming
grantee's potential practical liability for attorneys' fees is great enough
to create a reciprocal right to recover attorneys' fees. "[I]n every case
in which the non-assuming grantee has a sufficient interest in the
property to warrant his resisting foreclosure," the non-assuming grantee
can recover attorneys' fees in an action against the trustee of the preexisting deed of trust. 130
Courts have also extended Saucedo's "realistic" approach to other
situations where parties were not in privity of contract. :in Brusso v.
Running Springs Country Club, Inc., 131 the court reasoned that, where
plaintiffs had a right to recover their fees as the prevailing parties under
the substantial benefit doctrine, section 1717 creates a reciprocal right to
fees for defendants when they prevail. 132 The substantial benefit
doctrine is an equitable exception to the American Rule providing for
fee-shifting in favor of the plaintiff in certain cases, usually class ac.tion
or shareholder derivative suits. 133 Under the rule, prevailing plaintiffs
may recover their fees when they obtain a judgment resulting in a
"substantial benefit" to the defendants. 134 The Brusso court reasoned
that if plaintiffs . could have recovered their fees pursuant to the
substantial benefit doctrine, it would be unjust to deny defendants the
right to recover their fees. 135
Mutuality theory thus potentially extends the scope of section 1717 to
non-contractual exceptions to the American Rule. ·If section 1717
applies to the substantial benefit doctrine, there is no reason why it
would not apply to the other equitable exceptions to the American Rule

129. 1 HARRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA
REAL ESTATE§ 3:109 n.16 (rev. ed. 1975 & Supp. 1979), quoted in Saucedo v. Mercury
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 111 Cal. App. 3d 309, 314, 168 Cal. Rptr. 552, 555 (1980).
130. Saucedo, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 315, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
131. 228 Cal. App. 3d 92, 278 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1991).
132. Id. at 111, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
133. Id. at 99, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
134. See Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 943, 593
P.2d 200,214, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503,517 (1979); Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 38-40,
569 P.2d 1303, 1309-11, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 320-22 (1977); see also John P. Dawson,
Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597,
1609-11 (1974) (discussing lawyers' recovery of fees from common funds); PEARL,
supra, note 7 §§ 7-8 to 7-12.
135. Brusso, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 111, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
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in California: the common fund doctrine 136 and the equitable private
attorney general doctrine. 137 There have also been attempts to extend
section 1717 to statutory exceptions to the American Rule. In Covenant
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Young, 138 the court reversed a trial court's determination that section 1717 would make the attorneys' fees provision found
in Civil Code section 3318 reciprocal. 139 Section 3318 provides oneway fee-shifting in favor of plaintiffs in actions for breach of warranty
of authority. 140 The Covenant court refused to extend section 1717
into this statutory context. 141 Another court applied section 1717 to
the one-way fee-shifting provision of Civil Code section 3083, which
provides an award of attorneys' fees to the plaintiff in bonded stopnotice actions. 142 Yet another court extended section 1717 to Corporations Code section 800, which provides that in a shareholder derivative
suit the court may require plaintiffs to post a bond to cover the opposing
side's attorneys' fees. 143 Mutuality theory could potentially allow
application of section 1717 to the hundreds of fee-shifting provisions in

136. Under the common fund doctrine, a prevailing plaintiff can recover attorneys'
fees if fees come from a fund from which others derive benefit. The common fund
doctrine is usually employed in class action suits. The prevailing plaintiffs attorneys'
fees are paid from the "common fund," which of course is provided by the defendant.
See Serrano, 20 Cal. 3d at 35, 569 P.2d at 1307, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 318-19; see also
Dawson, supra note 134, at 1609-11; PEARL, supra note 7, § 7-4.
137. Under the equitable private attorney general doctrine, courts can award fees to
litigants who prevail in actions vindicating important public policy considerations or
constitutional rights. The doctrine's purpose is to encourage individuals to pursue such
actions on behalf of the public. See Serrano, 20 Cal. App. 3d at 43-46, 569 P.2d at
1312-14, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 324-26; PEARL, supra note 7, § 7-13. The doctrine also
provides a right for plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees in addition to rights available
under California's statutory private attorney general provision. See CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE§ 1021.5 (West Supp. 1995); see also Best v. California Apprenticeship Council,
193 Cal. App. 3d 1448, 1462 n.12, 240 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 n.12 (1987).
138. 179 Cal. App. 3d 318,225 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1986).
139. Id. at 320-21, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 862-63.
140. Beraksa v. Stardust Records, Inc., 215 Cal. App. 2d 708, 716, 30 Cal. Rptr.
504, 509 (1963).
141. Covenant, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 321-23, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 862-63.
142. However, as noted by the Covenant court, the California Supreme Court
ordered the case that extended § 1717 coverage to § 3083 to be depublished. See
Kelemen Constr., Inc. v. American City Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 804, 209 Cal. Rptr. 653
(1985) (depublished), cited in Covenant Mut. Ins. Co. v. Young, 179 Cal. App. 3d 318,
326 n.7, 225 Cal. Rptr. 861, 866 n.7 (1986).
143. Brusso v. Running Springs Country Club, Inc., 228 Cal. App. 3d 92, 110,278
Cal. Rptr. 758, 768 (1991). But see Alcott v. M.E.V. Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 797, 80001, 238 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522 (1987) (refusing to extend§ 1717 to Corporations Code
§ 800).
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the state's codes that limit the award of fees to one party, generally the
plaintiff. 144

III.

PROBLEMS

WITH CURRENT APPLICATION OF SECTION 1717

There are numerous problems, both practical and theoretical, with the
application of fee-shifting under section 1717 to contractual nonsignatories. The most basic problem is the lack of authorization for such
broad fee-shifting in the language or policy underlying the statute. A
second fundamental problem is the inconsistency between fee-shifting
based on the contractual exception to the American Rule in cases
involving contractual non-signatories and the basic principles of contract
law.. On a more practical level, the theories used to justify fee-shifting
are vastly over-inclusive. The logical inconsistencies in the theories also
lead to inconsistent application and unpredictable results.

A.

Lack of Statutory Basis

The fundamental flaw in applying section 1717 to cases involving
contractual non-signatories is the lack of support for such fee-shifting in
the language of the statute or the legislative history. 145 The first rule
of statutory interpretation is to start with the language of the statute and
apply its plain meaning. 146 The statute provides, in pertinent part:
In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that
attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be
awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party
who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she
is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable
attorney's fees in addition to other costs. 147

The only language in the statute that could support fee-shifting for nonsignatories is the phrase: ""whether he or she is the party specified in the
contract or not." 148 It is arguably unclear whether this phrase refers

144. Covenant, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 325 n.6, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 865 n.6; see also
Cuddy, supra note 8, at 149-50 (naming dozens of statutory fee-shifting provisions).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40, 64-65.
146. See Kimmel v. Goland, 51 Cal. 3d 202,209, 793 P.2d 524,527,271 Cal. Rptr.
191, 194 (1990); Kizer v. Hanna, 48 Cal. 3d 1, 8, 767 P.2d 679, 683, 255 Cal. Rptr.
412, 416 (1989).
147. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1717(a) {West Supp. 1995) {emphasis added).
148. Id.
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only to parties to the contract who are not specifically granted a right to
recover attorneys' fees by the contract, or whether it could have the
broader meaning of including non-parties as well.
The language of the statute, while not as clear as it could be, is not so
elastic as to include non-parties within its scope. If the Legislature
intended to include non-parties within the scope of section 1717, it
should have used the language "whether he or she is party to the
contract or not." 149 By using the phrase "specified in the contract," the
Legislature expressed its intent to allow all parties to a contract that
included an attorneys' fees clause to recover attorneys' fees, even if the
contract specifically limited that right to only certain parties. 150
Even if this language is ambiguous on its face, it should be interpreted
in the context of the purpose of section 1717. The statute was enacted
to address the problem of one-way fee-shifting in adhesion contracts. 151
In light of this purpose, this clause means only that if the contract
provides for fee-shifting in favor of only one party to the contract, such
a provision will be applied to all of the parties to the contract, regardless
of any specific limitation in the language of the contract. It does not
mean that any party prevailing in litigation over a contract containing an
attorneys' fees clause, whether a party to the contract or not, is entitled
to fees.
Furthermore, the policy rationales for section 1717 do not apply to
most of the situations currently litigated involving non-signatories.
Section 1717 was designed to address a specific problem that arose in
adhesion contracts affecting consumers. 152 In that specific context, one
party to the contract imposed one-way fee-shifting in its favor on the
party in the weaker bargaining position. The statute sought to end such
one-way fee-shifting provisions in adhesion contracts. Many of the
cases that have extended the effect of section 1717 to non-signatories do
not involve contracts with one-way fee-shifting provisions. 153 Section

a

149. Canal-Randolph Anaheim, Inc. v. Wilkoski, 78 Cal. App. 3d 477, 486, 143
Cal. Rptr. 789, 793 (1978); Arnold v. Browne, 27 Cal. App. 3d 386,398, 103 Cal. Rptr.
775, 784 (1972), disapproved by Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 25 Cal. 3d. 124, 129,
599 P.2d 83, 86, 158 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1979).
150. See Canal-Randolph, 78 Cal. App. 3d at 486, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 793; Saxon,
supra note 46, at 151. But see Babcock v. Omansky, 31 Cal. App. 3d 625, 633, 107
Cal. Rptr. 512, 518 (1973); Scheidegger, supra note 36, at 251-52.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
152. REVIEW, supra note 37, at 36; see also Coast Bank v. Holmes, 19 Cal. App.
3d 581, 597 n.3, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30, 39 n.3 (1971).
153. See, e.g., Real Property Servs. Corp. v. City of Pasadena, 25 Cal. App. 4th
375, 377-78, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536, 537-38 (1994); North Assocs, v. Bell, 184 Cal. App.
3d 860, 862, 229 Cal. Rptr. 305, 306 (1986); Steve Schmidt & Co. v. Berry, 183 Cal.
App. 3d 1299, 1315, 228 Cal. Rptr. 689, 698-99 (1986); Manier v. Anaheim Business
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1717 should not apply to contracts with two-way fee-shifting provisions
at all. 154 In addition, many of these cases do not involve contractual
overreaching by parties in superior bargaining positions; they entail
sophisticated parties in highly negotiated transactions. The attorneys'
fees clause in such cases is not part of an adhesion contract. 155

B.

Conflict With Basic Contract Principles

A second basic flaw in applying section 1717 to contractual nonsignatories is its logical inconsistency with elementary principles of
contract law. For instance, a party should be bound only by those
contractual provisions to which it has agreed. 156 Holding third party
beneficiaries, or any non-signatories to a contract in dispute, liable for
attorneys' fees pursuant to a contract to which they are a total stranger,
violates this basic rule. 157
There are certainly valid arguments in favor of fee-shifting. The
benefits of such fee-shifting may well merit abrogating contractual rights
in some instances. 158 If generally repealing the American Rule is to
be beneficial, however, it should be applied systematically, not
haphazardly, as it has been done under section 1717. 159 All litigants
should know the risks they court by engaging in a lawsuit. In the
absence of a general legislative revision of the American Rule in
California, courts should not require a party to pay attorneys' fees based
on a provision in a contract to which it was not a party.

Ctr. Co., 161 Cal. App. 3d 503, 508, 207 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511 (1984).
154. See Canal-Randolph, 78 Cal. App. 3d at 485, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 793; REVIEW,
supra note 37, at 36; Scheidegger, supra note 36, at 242. But see Beneficial Standard
Properties, Inc. v. Scharps, 67 Cal. App. 3d 227, 136 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1977) (specifically
applying § 1717 to a reciprocal fee-shifting provision).
155. See, e.g., Real Property Servs. Corp. v. City of Pasadena, 25 Cal. App. 4th
375, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536 (1994) (real property developer is party to multi-part
agreement); In re Vista Medical Investors, Ltd., 98 B.R. 29 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989)
(commercial real estate investors are parties to multi-part lease agreement).
156. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1550 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995).
157. See Super 7 Motel Assocs. v. Wang, 16 Cal. App. 4th 541, 546, 20 Cal. Rptr.
2d 193, 197 (1993).
158. See discussion supra at text accompanying notes 19-22.
159. For a discussion of inconsistent and haphazard revocation of the American
Rule, see infra part III.D.
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C.

Over-Inclusiveness of Theories

In addition to the external inconsistency with general contract
principles, both of the theories used to justify application of section 1717
to contractual non-signatories suffer from over-inclusiveness and internal
inconsistencies of logic.· Both theories, if followed mechanically, would
require a court to award fees to a prevailing party in situations in which
the party has no contractual, legal, or equitable right to them.
1.

Estoppel Theory

Estoppel theory suffers from over-inclusiveness because the trigger for
fee-shifting has no relationship to the contract in dispute, the governing
law, or the equities of the case. Estoppel theory awards attorneys' fees
to the prevailing party whenever the losing party has requested fees in
its pleadings. Fees could potentially be awarded in any contract action,
regardless of any other considerations. 160 This may be equitable in
some cases, like Reynolds, in which the signatory party is attempting to
impose contractual liability on a non-signatory. 161 Estoppel theory
creates reciprocity in such cases because the losing party would have
recovered his fees had he succeeded in proving the non-signatory
contractually liable. 162
In many other situations, however, mechanical application of estoppel
theory will produce inequitable and non-reciprocal results. For example,
applying estoppel theory would be highly inequitable when plaintiff
requests fees based on a contract that does not actually contain an
attorneys' fees clause. Plaintiffs may request fees by mistake, even
when they are not entitled to them. In one case, the court noted that
plaintiffs used a form complaint and checked the box for attorneys' fees.
"[T]here is nothing in the complaint that leads to the conclusion the
request for fees was based on an express contractual provision." 163
Neither was there any other basis for fees in the complaint. Plaintiffs in
this case would have been liable for fees to the prevailing non-signatory
under estoppel theory even though, had they won, they would have had
no right of recovery. 164 Fee-shifting in favor of the prevailing party

160. See supra text accompanying notes 99-107.
161. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 25 Cal. 3d 124, 127-29, 599 P.2d 83, 84-85,
158 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2-3 (1979).
162. Id. at 128-29, 599 P.2d at 86, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 2-3.
163. Pilcher v. Wheeler, 2 Cal. App. 4th 352, 356, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533, 536 (1992).
164, Estoppel theory allows such an outcome because the pleadings form the basis
for determining the right to recover fees, regardless of the actual facts proven at trial.
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would not create reciprocity here. The non-signatory defendant could
recover fees, while plaintiff could not. The resulting one-way feeshifting would not be fair. If plaintiff requested fees only accidentally,
or through use of a form complaint, she should not be punished so
drastically for this error. Because of these problems, courts created an
exception to estoppel theory for this situation: If the underlying contract
does not contain an attorneys' fees clause and the losing party has
requested fees anyway, then the losing party does not become liable for
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. 1 5
·
A second example of estoppel theory's over-inclusiveness arises when
a contract is unenforceable because it is illegal. If the contract is illegal,
the signatory could never, as a practical matter, have prevailed. The lack
of reciprocity and unfairness to the losing party discussed supra also
apply here. Courts therefore reasoned that, if the contract in dispute is
unenforceable on grounds of illegality, the attorneys' fees clause is also
unenforceable. 166 One court explained this exception as follows:
"[W]here neither party can enforce the agreement there is no need for a
mutual right to attorney's fees." 167 When only some of the contract's
terms are unenforceable, but the contract itself is enforced, fees may be
·
awarded, however. 168
A third example occurs when a party.brings a declaratory relief action
to determine its rights and obligations under a contract to which it is not
a signatory. If the non-signatory plaintiff includes a demand for fees in
the pleadings without any contractual basis for fee-shifting, he would
See Jones v. Drain, 149 Cal. App. 3d 484, 489, 196 Cal. Rptr. 827, 830-31 (1983); see
also supra text accompanying notes 99-107.
165. See Pilcher, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 356, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 536; Green v. Mt. Diablo
Hosp. Dist., 207 Cal. App. 3d 63, 76, 254 Cal. Rptr. 689, 697 (1989); see also Myers
Bldg. Indus., Ltd. v. Interface Technology, Inc., 13 Cal. App. 4th 949, 962 n.12, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 242, 250 n.12 (1993) (holding that the prevailing party is not entitled to fees
under estoppel theory where the underlying contract. is an indemnity agreement that
provides for fees relating only to third party claims); Alhambra Redev. Agency v.
Transamerica Fin. Servs., 212 Cal. App. 3d 1370, 1380-82, 261 Cal. Rptr. 248, 253-54
(1989) (holding that when the parties had waived the underlying right to attorneys' fees,
no estoppel could apply).
166. See Bovard v. American Horse Enters., Inc., 201 Cal. App. 3d 832, 843, 247
Cal. Rptr. 340, 346 (1988); Geffen v. Moss, 53 Cal. App. 3d 215, 227, 125 Cal. Rptr.
687, 694 (1975).
.
167. Care Constr., Inc. v. Century Convalescent Ctrs., 54 Cal. App. 3d 701, 707,
126 Cal. Rptr. 761, 765 (1976).
168. South Bay Transp. Co. v. Gordon Sand Co., 206 Cal. App. 3d 650,661,253
Cal. Rptr. 753, 759-60 (1988).
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then become liable for fees if he lost. Such automatic application of
estoppel theory also causes non-reciprocal and inequitable results. 169
Numerous other exceptions to estoppel theory would have to be
created whenever a court determines that the automatic application of
section 1717 is inequitable. Indeed, several courts have specifically
rejected estoppel theory in favor of mutuality theory when faced with
this problem. 1 0

2.

Mutuality Theory

Mutuality theory also suffers from over-inclusiveness because of its
very nature. Under mutuality theory, a court must look to the losing
party's right to recover attorneys' fees in determining the prevailing
party's reciprocal right to recover attorneys' fees. 171 As a consequence, whenever a court creates a new right to attorneys' fees under
section 1717, it generates an unintended "domino effect" of fee awards.
In later cases, the first case has established a legal right to recover fees
in favor of the prevailing party in a factual situation similar to the
original case. If that party should lose in the second case, she is then
liable for fees under mutuality theory because she could have actually
recovered her fees if she had prevailed pursuant to the new rule created
in the first case. The prevailing party in the second case then has a right
to recover fees. 172 This process could create a right to recover
attorneys' fees for many parties who have no pre-existing legal,
contractual, or equitable right to fee-shifting. Such new rules of feeshifting could also contradict existing legal rules regarding liability for

169. See Leach v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 185 Cal. App. 3d 1295, 1306-07, 230
Cal. Rptr. 553, 560-61 (1986), where the court refused to apply estoppel theory to a
losing non-signatory plaintiff who brought a declaratory relief action requesting fees.
The court applied mutuality theory instead, and did not award fees.
170. See, e.g., Super 7 Motel Assocs. v. Wang, 16 Cal. App. 4th 541, 548, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 193, 198 (1993); Myers Bldg. Indus., Ltd. v. Interface Technology, Inc., 13 Cal.
App. 4th 949, 962 n.12, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242, 250 n.12 (1993); Alhambra Redev.
Agency v. Transamerica Fin. Servs., 212 Cal. App. 3d 1370, 1380-82, 261 Cal. Rptr.
248, 253-54 (1989); Leach, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 1307, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
171. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
172. For example, as discussed supra in text accompanying notes 123-30, Saucedo
created a right on behalf of the non-assuming grantee to recover her attorneys' fees from
the trustee based on mutuality. Saucedo v. Mercury Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 111 Cal. App.
3d 309, 168 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1980). Santa Clara Sav. subsequently held that this right
to fees was reciprocal in favor of the trustee in a non-assuming grantee situation. Santa
Clara Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Pereira, 164 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1098, 211 Cal. Rptr. 54,
59 (1985). See infra text accompanying notes 183-85. Other examples are discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 174-77.
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attorneys' fees. 173 This problem has arisen in at least three of the four
factual situations in which fee-shifting generally occurs in cases
involving contractual non-signatories. It could potentially happen every
time a court creates a right to fees where none existed before.
For example, the problem can occur when a signatory plaintiff seeks
to enforce a contract against a non-signatory defendant who asserts that
the contract is unenforceable. If the non-signatory prevails, he could
recover fees pursuant to section 1717. 174 As stated above, mutuality
only requires the possibility that the losing party could have prevailed,
regardless of how slight the chance. 175 If the signatory were to prevail
instead, in a later case involving the same facts, he could recover his
attorneys' fees under mutuality theory. The authority created by the
earlier cases creates a reciprocal right to fees for both parties in the later
action. This is true even in cases where the signatory prevails on the
contract despite the non-signatory defendant's lack ofprivity of contract
with the plaintiff. This could occur when a lessee of real property sues
to enforce the terms of the lease against a party who acquired the
property through foreclosure. The parties are not in privity of contract,
but the signatory lessor has a right to continue to occupy the property
because of privity of estate. 176 In such cases, mutuality theory turns
a situation in which neither party has a right to recover attorneys' fees
into one in which both parties can recover their fees. 177 This is the
wrong result because the non-signatory never agreed to any of the terms
of the contract, including the attorneys' fees provision. He should,
therefore, not be bound by the terms of that contract.
The third party beneficiary scenario is another area in which mutuality
theory can create an entitlement to fees in favor of parties with no preexisting legal, contractual, or equitable right to them. A third party
beneficiary to a contract is not a signatory to the contract, but she can

173. See, e.g., Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 15 Cal. 3d 590, 596-97, 542 P.2d 981, 98586, 125 Cal. Rptr. 557, 561-62 (1975) (holding that trustee cannot recover any obligation
from a non-assuming grantee).
174. See, e.g., Care Constr. v. Century Convalescent Ctrs., Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d
701, 707, 126 Cal. Rptr. 761, 765 (1976).
175. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
176. Salisbury v. Shirley, 66 Cal. 223, 225-26, 1 P. 104, 106 (1884); see also 42
CAL. JUR. 3D Landlord & Tenant§ 57, at 76 (1978).
177. See supra note 172.
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bring suit to enforce her rights under the agreement. 178 In some cases,
a third party beneficiary who seeks to enforce her rights under a contract
containing an attorneys' fees clause is entitled to recover her attorneys'
fees. 179 If the third party beneficiary had lost the action instead,
mutuality theory would make the right to recover attorneys' fees
reciprocal. This is the wrong result because the third party beneficiary
never agreed to any of the terms of the contract, including the attorneys'
fees provision. The third party beneficiary becomes obligated by the
attorneys' fees provision of the contract merely because she receives
some benefit from the contract. Some courts have disagreed with this
result, 180 but it remains a logical consequence of mutuality theory. 181
The non-assuming grantee scenario is also subject to the unjustified
results of mutuality theory. The theory entitles the non-assuming grantee
to recover fees from the trustee of the pre-existing deed of trust in a
foreclosure action. Using the same analysis when the trustee prevails in
such an action instead and subsequently seeks attorneys' fees, the court
must first determine if the losing non-assuming grantee could have
recovered his fees if he had prevailed. As discussed above, prior courts
applying mutuality theory have created such a right· in favor of the nonassuming grantee. 182 The trustee is therefore entitled to recover fees
under mutuality theory because the right is reciprocal. At least one court
has followed this syllogism and granted fees to a prevailing trustee in an
action against a non-assuming grantee pursuant to section 1717. 183
Prior to the application of section 1717, the trustee had no legal right to
recover attorneys' fees from a non-assuming grantee because a nonassuming grantee is not personally liable for obligations created by the
pre-existing. note and deed of trust. 184 Thus, by applying mutuality
theory, the courts created a new entitlement on behalf of both nonassuming grantees and trustees in actions regarding the deed of trust. 185

178. See CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1559 {West 1982 & Supp. 1995).
179. See Steve Schmidt & Co. v. Berry, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1299, 1315-17, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 689, 698-700 (1986); see also infra text accompanying notes 200-02.
180. See Super 7 Motel Assocs. v. Wang, 16 Cal. App. 4th 541, 546, 20 Cal. Rptr.
2d 193, 197 (1993).
181. See infra text accompanying notes 200-07.
182. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
183. Santa Clara Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Pereira, 164 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1098, 211
Cal. Rptr. 54, 59 (1985).
184. Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 15 Cal. 3d 590, 596-97, 542 P.2d 981, 985-86, 125
Cal. Rptr. 557, 561-62 (1975).
185. See Santa Clara Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Pereira, 164 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1098,
211 Cal. Rptr. 54, 59 (1985); Saucedo v. Mercury Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 111 Cal. App.
3d 309, 168 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1980).
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In addition to these three typical kinds of cases, section 1717's effects
could possibly extend to non-contractual one-way fee-shifting rules.
This creates even. greater disruptions to the pre-existing scheme of rights
to attorneys' fees. The statutory and equitable fee-shifting provisions are
intended to encourage litigation in certain circumstances and by certain
parties, generally plaintiffs. 186 These rules permit individuals with
relatively small interests in the.outcome of litigation to enforce the rights
of others with similar interests. The interests of each aggrieved
individual may be too small to make pursuing litigation economically
viable. 187 Attorneys' fees alone could well outweigh any possible
benefit for the individual. 188 Only by creating a possibility of recovering fees does a lawsuit become practical in many cases. 189 Making
fee-shifting reciprocal would create a tremendous disincentive for any
individual plaintiff to proceed with such an action. 190 Not only would
these potential plaintiffs bear the risk of not recovering their own
attorneys' fees, but they could suffer the huge risk of becoming liable
for the defendants' fees as well. The risk would likely eliminate such
suits in all but the most compelling cases. 191

D.

Inconsistent Results

The over-inclusiveness and incoherence of the theories supporting fee.:
shifting for contractual non-signatories pursuant to section 1717 create
exceptions and inconsistencies in the application of section 1717, as
courts strain to provide a right to fees they think are merited. Both
estoppel and mutuality theories suffer from inconsistent results that make
their application to particular factual situations largely subject to the
preferences of individual judges. Although the manifestations of this
problem are different for each theory, litigants have very little certainty

186. See Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039,
2045-75 (1993), which discusses the effect of eliminating one-way fee-shifting statutes
at the federal level. The same analysis applies at the state level. See also Covenant
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Young, 179 Cal. App. 3d 318, 326, 225 Cal. Rptr. 861, 866 (1986).
187. See Krent, supra note 186, at 2050.
188. Id. at 2051.
189. Id. at 2048.
190. See Mause, supra note 11, at 35-36.
191. Id.; Covenant Mut. Ins. Co. v. Young, 179 Cal. App. 3d 318, 326, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 861, 866 (1986).
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about the result in any given case. This creates practical problems for
courts and litigants, including increased litigation over attorneys' fees.

1. Estoppel Theory
Estoppel theory suffers from indeterminacy and inconsistency because
of its exceptions. As discussed above, there are two recognized
exceptions to estoppel theory: courts will not award attorneys' fees to
the prevailing party when the underlying contract is not legally enforceable, 192 nor when the contract does not actually contain an attorneys'
fees provision. 193 Additional exceptions might be necessary: for
example, when a party requests attorneys' fees based on a declaratory
relief action when the contract gives no right to attorneys' fees. 194
While such exceptions to estoppel theory make its application more
equitable, they are totally inconsistent with its logic. Because estoppel
is based on the parties' allegations and not on the evidence proven at
trial, the baselessness of the claim to attorneys' fees should be irrelevant.195 Logically, estoppel theory posits that the more frivolous the
losing party's claim to attorneys' fees, the greater the prevailing party's
right to recover them. Estoppel theory should permit-indeed encourage
-fee-shifting when the losing party could not possibly have recovered
his own attorneys' fees. This would appear to be the most obvious case
for imposing fees, and the truest test of estoppel theory.
In addition, these exceptions make application of estoppel theory
inconsistent and unpredictable. It is difficult to justify the distinction
between a contract held unenforceable on grounds of illegality and a
contract held unenforceable on any other ground. In both cases, the
signatory party has unsuccessfully attempted to enforce a contract vis-a.vis a non-signatory. In both cases, the signatory party would have
recovered fees under section 1717 had she prevailed. Yet, in the case
of illegality, the courts have held that an award of attorneys' fees is
impossible, 196 while in other cases it is merely unlikely.
This distinction between "impossible" and "un1ikely" is arbitrary.
What if the question of a contract's illegality was an extremely close
legal question that could have gone the other way? As a practical

192. See supra text accompanying notes 166-68.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 163-65.
194. See supra text accompanying note 169.
195. See Manier v. Anaheim Business Ctr. Co., 161 Cal. App. 3d 503, 508, 207
Cal. Rptr. 508, 511 (1984); Jones v. Drain, 149 Cal. App. 3d 484, 489, 196 Cal. Rptr.
827, 830-31 (1983).
196. See, e.g., Care Constr., Inc. v. Century Convalescent Ctrs., Inc., 54 Cal. App.
3d 701, 707, 126 Cal. Rptr. 761, 765 (1976).
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matter, the signatory party's right to recover attorneys' fees is merely
unlikely in that case, not impossible. The same argument could be made
as to any other exception to estoppel theory. The theory would
theoretically entitle a party to recover attorneys' fees any time he
requested them, his contentions were correct, and he prevailed. The
likelihood of any party prevailing is a matter of degree. In some cases
the court may find that its decision is inevitable. In other cases, that
result is merely likely or probable. Such a distinction is arbitrary. 197
The courts' refusal to carry estoppel theory through to its logical
conclusion highlights its weakness as a basis for allowing attorneys' fees
to non-signatories under section 1717. Courts will create new exceptions
in every casein which it appears inequitable to follow the theory.

2.

Mutuality Theory

Mutuality theory also suffers from inconsistent application and results,
mirroring the problem with estoppel theory. Under mutuality theory, the
prevailing party can recover fees only if the losing party would actually
have recovered attorneys' fees had she prevailed. 198 Ultimately, the
decision whether the losing party could have recovered fees is subjective. 199 One court may decide that the possibility of the losing party
recovering fees is totally speculative and therefore would deny fees to
the prevailing party. In other cases with similar facts, courts may weigh
the evidence differently and find that the losing party could actually have
recovered attorneys' fees and therefore award them to the prevailing
party.
Third party beneficiary cases are rife with such inconsistencies. In
some cases, third party beneficiaries have recovered fees. 200 Later

197. For example, this problem could arise in the non-assuming grantee situation.
As noted supra note 124 in Cornelison, a prevailing trustee has no right to recover
attorneys' fees from the non-assuming grantee. Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 15 Cal. 3d
590, 596-97, 542 P.2d 981, 985-86, 125 Cal. Rptr. 557, 561-62 (1975). A trustee's
request for fees would be impossible and thus should not trigger any reciprocal right to
fees under estoppel theory. But, as discussed supra at text accompanying note 185, the
Periera court held that a trustee may recover attorneys' fees from a non-assuming
grantee. Santa Clara Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Pereira, 164 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1098, 211
Cal. Rptr. 54, 59 (1985). See generally text accompanying notes 182-85.
198. See supra text accompanying note 116.
199. See infra text accompanying notes 200-24.
200. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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cases have then made the rule reciprocal and held third party beneficiaries liable for attorneys fees based on mutuality. 201 In other cases,
third party beneficiaries have not been able to recover their attorneys'
fees, and then later cases have made that rule reciprocal. 202 There is
no justifiable distinction between these different cases.
Under one line of cases, courts have awarded fees to the prevailing
party when a sub-tenant of real property sues the master lessor of the
property based on the master lease, which contained an attorneys' fees
provision. In the first such case, the sub-tenant prevailed. The court
held that the sub-tenant was entitled to recover fees under section 1717
because it was a third party beneficiary of the master lease, and the suit
was based on the contract.203 In the next case that involved subtenants and master lessors contesting the terms of the master lease, the
master lessor prevailed.204 The first case created authority entitling the
sub-tenants to recover fees if they prevailed.205 In the second case, the
lessors prevailed and mutuality entitled them to recover fees. 206 This
line of cases established that third party beneficiaries are entitled to the
benefits of an attorneys' fees clause in a contract to which they are not
a party.207 This right is made reciprocal by mutuality theory.
In another line of cases involving third party beneficiaries, however,
courts have not allowed fee-shifting. In Super 7 Motel Assocs. v. Wang,
the court did not award attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant
claiming to be a third party beneficiary of a real property purchase

201. See, e.g., Real Property Servs. Corp. v. City of Pasadena, 25 Cal. App. 4th
375, 383-84, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536, 541-42 (1994).
202. See, e.g., Super 7 Motel Assocs. v. Wang, 16 Cal. App. 4th 541, 546, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 193, 197 (1993).
203. In re Vista Medical Investors, Ltd., 98 B.R. 29, 34 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989).
204. Real Property Servs. Corp. v. City of Pasadena, 25 Cal. App. 4th 375, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 536 (1994).
205. In re Vista Medical Investors, Ltd., 98 B.R. 29 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989).
206. Real Property Servs. Corp., 25 Cal. App. 4th at 383-84, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
541-42. In contrast to the sub-tenant scenario in Vista Medical and Real Property, a
tenant could alternatively assign her interest in the real property to a third party, without
making her a sub-tenant, and without the lessor's consent, causing quite a different
outcome. In one such scenario, the court refused to award fees to the assignee who
prevailed in an unlawful detainer action initiated by the lessor. To differentiate the
treatment of assignees as compared to sub-tenants, the court held that an assignee was
not a known third party beneficiary of the master lease, and therefore could not take
advantage of the attorneys' fees clause in that contract. Artesia Medical Dev. Co. v.
Regency Assocs., Ltd., 214 Cal. App. 3d 957,266 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1989). Cf. Wilson's
Heating & Air Cond. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1326, 1334, 249 Cal. Rptr.
553, 558 (1988) (recognizing that third party beneficiaries might be entitled to recover
fees under § 1717, but refusing to award fees on other grounds).
207. Vista Medical, 98 B.R. at 34.
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contract.208 It categorically rejected the claim that a third party
beneficiary is either entitled to recovery of or liability for attorneys' fees
under section 1717:
[There is] no authority suggesting a third party beneficiary has any right other
than to collect the benefits the contracting parties agreed to confer on him.
Indeed, the basic premise underlying attorney fee clauses, i.e., a party is not
liable for attorney fees unless he agrees to the clause, is inconsistent with [the
attorneys' fees] theory, because a third party beneficiary does not participate in
reaching the agreement. 209

This rule potentially creates reciprocal protection from liability for fees
in later cases where the third party beneficiary loses.
The case law does not logically explain why third party beneficiaries
of real property leases are treated differently from third party beneficiaries of purchase and sale agreements under mutuality _theory. 210 Nor
is there any way to predict how a third party· beneficiary in any other
factual situation would fare. All mutuality theory will .predict is the
reciprocity between a third party beneficiary's right to recover attorneys'
fees and its liability for fees. 211
A second area of uncertainty under mutuality theory exists in cases
applying the non-assuming grantee standard of practical liability for feeshifting. As discussed above in the non-assuming grantee cases, courts
have held that, despite the non-assuming grantee's lack of legal
obligation to pay the prevailing trustee's attorneys' fees, he must, as a
practical matter, pay such fees in order to protect his interest in the
property. Accordingly, under mutuality theory the non-assuming
grantee can recover attorneys' fees if he prevails. 12
This same line of reasoning has been applied in other circumstances
with limited success. In one such case, Clar v. Cacciola,213 the parties

208. Super 7 Motel Assocs. v. Wang, 16 Cal. App. 4th 541, 546, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d
193, 197 (1993).
,209. Id.
210. But see Steve Schmidt & Co. v. Berry, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1299, 228 Cal. Rptr.
689 (1986) (broker was a third party beneficiary of a real property purchase agreement
who recovered fees under estoppel theory); Jones v. Drain, 149 Cal. App. 3d 484, 196
Cal. Rptr. 827 (1983) (third party beneficiary of a real property purchase agreement was
held liable for fees under estoppel theory).
211. Real Property Servs. Corp. v. City of Pasadena, 25 Cal. App. 4th 375, 383-84,
30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536, 541-42 (1994).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 123-30.
213. 193 Cal. App. 3d 1032, 238 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1987).'
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had competing claims about the priority of two deeds of trust on real
property. Each party claimed that his own interest in the property was
the second deed of trust and that the other party's deed of trust was in
third position.214 Defendants prevailed and claimed a right to recover
attorneys' fees without privity of contract between the parties.215
Defendants argued that, had they lost, plaintiffs would have then been
able to recover attorneys' fees through a foreclosure proceeding, just as
in the case of the non-assuming grantee.216 According to this argument, plaintiffs' attorneys' fees would have been added to the secured
debt under the terms of the deed of trust, which the defendants would
have had to pay to protect their equity in the property. The court
rejected this theory and held that the defendants' potential obligation to
pay fees was too speculative.217 The court reasoned that defendants
may or may not have decided to redeem the property if plaintiffs had
prevailed and had then instituted foreclosure proceedings. 18
. This decision depended on the court making assumptions about the
prevailing party's monetary interest in the property and the likely actions
of the losing party if he or she had prevailed. These assumptions are
totally speculative. The court's holding was based largely on its
subjective interpretation of the likely course of events in this counterfactual scenario.219
In practical liability and third party beneficiary cases, courts must
make very fact specific analyses about the prevailing party's potential
liability had she lost. 220 Nearly identical factual circumstances could
yield entirely different results. The danger with analyzing the prevailing

214. Id. at 1033, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
215. Id. at 1037, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
216. Id. at 1037-38, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
217. Id. at 1039, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
218. Id. In a similar case, plaintiffs were the owners ofreal property and defendant
was a lender with a security interest in the property that derived from the prior owner,
not the plaintiffs. Alhambra Redev. Agency v. Transamerica Fin. Servs., 212 Cal. App.
3d 1370, 261 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1989). When the property was taken by eminent domain,
the parties disputed their relative rights to the proceeds of the condemnation award. The
property owners prevailed and attempted to recover attorneys' fees based on a contract
provision contained in the prior owner's deed of trust on the property. The prevailing
party argued that, as a practical matter, it would have been liable for fees had it lost
because the trustee's attorneys' fees would have come from the condemnation proceeds
pursuant to a statutory scheme governing eminent domain proceedings. The court
rejected this argument because it did not find that the prevailing party could actually
have been liable for fees if it had lost, based on the facts of that case.
219. Clar, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 1039, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
220. See, e.g., Smith v. Kreuger, 150 Cal. App. 3d 752, 757, 198 Cal. Rptr. 174,
176 (1983).
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party's practical liability is subjectivity and lack of guidelines for the
courts to follow. 221

3.

Resulting Problems

The inconsistent application of section 1717 will generate other
practical problems for courts and for litigants. First, it will increase the
costs of litigation. Parties will be forced to litigate not only the
substance of their disputes but also their rights to recover attorneys' fees.
The burden on the courts will increase as more parties seek to appeal
inconsistent attorneys' fees awards. 222
Second, uncertainty and inconsistent results under section 1717 may
undermine the judiciary's legitimacy in settling civil disputes. 223
Litigants will see courts awarding fees based solely upon the equities of
the cases, irrespective of the parties' contractual obligations. If judges
were simply to rely upon their subjective perceptions of fairness in the
circumstances of individual cases, parties may hesitate to trust the whims
of such an overtly subjective system.224 Difficult to verify or quantify,
such hesitancy is a logical conclusion if parties seek predictable results
from a dispute resolution system. The lack of such predictability may
lower confidence in the judicial system.

221. In one common situation, real estate brokers are third party beneficiaries of real
property agreements containing attorneys' fees clauses. In Super 7 Motel Assocs., the
court held that a real estate broker in this situation could not recover his fees under
§ 1717 because "he had no contractual obligations or interest in the sale of the property."
Super 7 Motel Assocs v. Wang, 16 Cal. App. 4th 541, 545, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 197
(1993). But see Jones v. Drain 149 Cal. App. 3d 484, 487, 196 Cal. Rptr. 827, 829
(1983) (awarding fees to real estate broker in same situation, using estoppel theory);
Steve Schmidt & Co. v. Berry, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1299, 1317, 228 Cal. Rptr. 689, 700
(1986) (same).
222. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 541 (noting that uncertainty generates litigation,
especially appellate litigation); id. at 572 (noting that the British Rule creates satellite
litigation regarding attorneys' fees); Mause, supra note 11, at 48; see also Krent, supra
note 186, at 2082-88.
223. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms
of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38 (1979), which argues that the legitimacy of the
judiciary depends ori its ability to render "competent" decisions that create social value.
224. This problem has been discussed extensively in the area of constitutional
interpretation. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 739, 763 (1982) (discussing the need for objective interpretation of the Constitution); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 45-87 (1986) (making similar arguments).
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IV.

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF FEE-SHIFTING FOR CONTRACTUAL
NON-SIGNATORIES UNDER SECTION 1717

A number of arguments favor fee-shifting under section 1717 for
contractual non-signatories: fee-shifting is more equitable, it encourages
meritorious claims and discourages frivolous claims, it properly
compensates prevailing parties, it punishes losing parties who bring
frivolous claims, and it encourages settlement. It is important to explore
these arguments in order to weigh the benefits against the problems with
applying section 1717 to non-signatories.

A.

Equity

Equity is the most important argument in favor of the application of
section 1717 to contractual non-signatories. This rationale is cited again
andagain in the cases that allow such fee-shifting. 225 It is true that in
some cases the losing party could have recovered attorneys' fees from
the prevailing party if the loser had prevailed.226 Therefore, it would
be unfair to deny the prevailing party that same right. Section 1717's
undoubted purpose was to make attorneys' fees awards more equitable
and ensure that one-way fee-shifting did not occur under the contractual
exception to the American Rule. 227
The right to attorneys' fees, however, is a two-edged sword that can
generate as much inequity as equity. For every non-signatory who
recovers fees based on an extension of section 1717, another nonsignatory in a different case potentially becomes liable for attorneys' fees
based on mutuality. 228 In some ways, this result is equitable. It allows
a wronged party to recover the full measure of its damages. In other
ways, it is inequitable. It requires a party who has not agreed to any
such contractual provision to be liable for the prevailing party's
attorneys' fees. The balance between these factors will vary with each
case. Equity is not always a strong argument in favor of fee-shifting for
contractual non-signatories under section 1717.

225. See, e.g., Brusso v. Running Springs Country Club, Inc., 228 Cal. App. 3d 92,
110, 278 Cal. Rptr. 758, 767 (1991); Jones, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 489, 196 Cal. Rptr. at
830; Lewis v. Alpha Beta Co., 141 Cal. App. 3d 29, 189 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1983).
226. See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, 25 Cal. 3d 124, 129, 599 P.2d 83,
86, 158 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1979); Babcock v. Omansky, 31 Cal. App. 3d 625,633, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 512, 518 (1973).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 174-85, 203-07.
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B.

Creating Proper Incentives and Disincentives For Litigation

A second argument in favor of applying section 1717 to contractual
non-signatories is based on the idea that adoption of the British Rule
discourages frivolous claims and encourages small but meritorious
claims.229 Such a rule would encourage a contractual non-signatory
party to litigate a meritorious contract claim, even if costly to do so,
because she could recover attorneys' fees if she prevailed. Likewise, a
party would not bring a frivolous claim, even with huge resources at her
disposal, because she would have to pay the winning side's attorneys'
fees if she lost. 230 Some have argued that if this theory is true in the
broader context, it should also be true in the specific case of section
1717 .231 Furthermore, this argument is consistent with the policies
underlying section 1717 of encouraging poorer individuals to vindicate
their rights through the courts and deterring wealthy and powerful
litigants from intimidating poorer opponents by filing frivolous
actions. 232
Further analysis, however, reveals that such wider fee-shifting may
actually discourage claims by poorer individual litigants, in conflict with
the purpose of section 1717 .233 Poorer individual litigants are likely
to be more risk averse than institutions and wealthier individuals because
the poor can ill afford to incur a substantial judgment for attorneys'
fees. 434 Therefore, the deterrent effect of fee-shifting will be greater
on poorer litigants and they will file fewer claims under the British Rule
than under the American Rule. 235 This problem does not occur when
the statute merely makes one-way fee-shifting provisions reciprocal,
because turning a one-way fee-shifting provision (which usually benefits

229. See authorities cited supra notes 20-21.
230. See supra note 21.
231. See Saxon, supra note 46, at 153.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
233. Covenant Mut. Ins. Co. v. Young, 179 Cal. App. 3d 318, 326, 225 Cal. Rptr.
861, 866 (1986).
234. Id. at 326 n.8, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 866 n.8 (citing Michael Zander, Costs of
Litigation-A Study in the Queens Bench Division, 72 L. Soc'Y'S GAZETTE 679, 680
(1975)).
235. See Marc Galanter, Why The "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
Limits ofLegal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 99-100 & n.11 (1974); Mause, supra
note 11, at 36; infra text accompanying notes 277-79.
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a wealthy corporation or individual) into a reciprocal two-way feeshifting provision can only benefit the newly empowered party,
regardless of wealth. 236 When the statute is applied to cases in which
there is no fee-shifting provision in effect, however, new forces come
into play. The new fee-shifting rule can actually deter poor individuals
from seeking to vindicate their rights through the courts. 237
Furthermore, the assumption that wider fee-shifting under section 1717
would efficiently affect primary litigation conduct is subject to some
doubt given its current inconsistent application. For example, a third
party beneficiary of a contract containing an attorneys' fees clause has
no indication as to whether it would recover fees under current law. 238
Fee-shifting under section 1717 in cases involving contractual nonsignatories is thus unlikely to have any deterrent effect because it is
applied in such an inconsistent manner. Most attorneys, let alone most
parties, have no idea when courts will apply section 1717 to contractual
non-signatories under the current rules. It,is therefore extremely unlikely
to deter potential litigants from pursuing an action. 239 Consequently,
applying section 1717 to contractual non-signatorieswill,have a minimal
effect on individual decisions about filing actions. Deterring frivolous
litigation fails as a strong argument in favor of fee-shifting in cases
involving contractual non-signatories.
C.

Compensation

Compensating litigants for enduring frivolous contract claims or
defenses is a third argument in favor of applying section 1717 to nonsignatories. If a prevailing plaintiff must pay her own attorneys' fees
out of the award, she is not made whole by the judgment.240 It may,
in fact, cost more to win a judgment than the award itself.241 Likewise, a prevailing defendant has to bear potentially huge costs of
litigation incurred in defending a frivolous claim.242 Based on these
arguments, some courts have held that a prevailing litigant is equitably

236.
237.
238.
239.
deterrent
240.
241.
242.
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See supra text accompanying notes 186-91.
Covenant, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 326-28, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 866-68.
See supra text accompanying notes 203-1 I.
See Mause, supra note 11, at 46 (noting that uncertain results corrode the
effect of fee-shifting on frivolous lawsuits).
See supra note 19.
See discussion supra note 2.
See supra note 19.
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entitled to compensation when its opponent alleges a losing contract
claim or defense. 243
This argument falls short when applied to section 1717. Fee-shifting
under section 1717 does not occur when the action is totally frivolous
and such compensation is most deserving: where the contract fails for
illegality or where the contract does not even contain an attorneys' fees
clause.244 Furthermore, if a claim is truly frivolous, the defendant
already has the remedy of seeking sanctions or filing a malicious
prosecution action. 245 These devices also have the necessary dueprocess limitations to prevent their overuse and abuse by the courts and
by litigants.246
Finally, as a general matter, it is not clear that, simply because a party
prevails in a lawsuit, he is logically or equitably entitled to recover
attorneys' fees. 247 A losing party may have been fully justified in
pursuing an ultimately losing claim or defense. He may have been
seeking to establish a novel legal claim or defense in good faith. 248
Quite possibly, a party could prevail based on the thinnest of legal
technicalities while the equities all lie with the losing party. 249 In sum,
the losing party has not necessarily caused any harm to the prevailing
party, even though the latter recovered a judgment. Therefore, it is not
uniformly true that the prevailing party is entitled to compensation from
the losing party for attorneys' fees. A blanket rule providing for feeshifting on the basis of the compensation rationale is not compelling.

243. See North Assocs. v. Bell, 184 Cal. App. 3d 860, 865,229 Cal. Rptr. 305,308
(1986); Jones v. Drain, 149 Cal. App. 3d 484, 490, 196 Cal. Rptr. 827, 830 (1983).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 163-68.
245. See, e.g., On v. Cow Hollow Properties, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1568, 272 Cal. Rptr.
535 (1990) (prevailing party sought fees not only based on§ 1717, but as sanctions as
well).
246. For example,§ 128.7 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides that
sanctions may only be awarded after the sanctioned party has an opportunity for a
hearing devoted to the sanctions motion. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 128.7 (West Supp.
1995). The California Supreme Court addressed the due process safeguards necessary
for an award of sanctions. See Bauguess v. Paine, 22 Cal. 3d 626, 638, 586 P.2d 942,
949, 150 Cal. Rptr. 461, 468 (1978). See also Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers, 222 Cal.
App. 3d 970, 976, 272 Cal. Rptr. 126, 129-30 (1990) (noting that due process requires
notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to imposition of sanctions).
247. See Mause, supra note 11, at 28-30.
248. See id. at 46.
249. See id. at 28-30; Rowe, supra note 13, at 655.
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D.

Punishment of Frivolous Litigants

Using section 1717 to punish parties engaging in frivolous litigation
is a fourth argument in favor of extending fee-shifting to contractual
non-signatories. 250 In On v. Cow Hollow Properties,251 the court
specifically granted fees to the prevailing party on the alternative bases
of section 1717 and California Code of Civil Procedure section
128.5.252 The latter provides for an award of attorneys' fees in cases
of bad faith litigation tactics. 253
The equitable basis of section 171
17 could easily allow courts to use
it as a tool for punishing litigants for acting in bad faith or for bringing
a frivolous claim,254 consistent with the general arguments supporting
broad adoption of the British Rule. 255 But, while deterring frivolous
lawsuits and compensating litigants for enduring such actions is an
unarguably lofty goal, it would be an improper use of section 1717. The
legislature intended section 1717 only to make the contractual right of
the prevailing party to recover attorneys' fees equally available to both
parties to a contract.256 Courts may not award attorneys' fees as
sanctions absent specific statutory authority. 257 Without appropriate
statutory safeguards and guidelines to limit the courts' discretion to
sanction litigants, "serious due process problems would result."258 Fee
awards may also dampen counsels' ardor in presenting their clients'
positions, thereby undermining the adversary system. Attorneys may be
less willing to pursue novel legal theories if they are concerned about the
250. See Saxon, supra note 46, at 153.
251. 222 Cal. App. 3d 1568, 272 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1990).
252. Id. at 1574-76, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 538-40.
253. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 128.5 (West Supp. 1995). The section provides, in
pertinent part: "Every trial court may order a party, the party's attorney, or both to pay
any reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a result
of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary
delay." The California Legislature recently enacted legislation that suspends the
operation of§ 128.5 until January I, 1999, substituting in its place, for a four-year trial
period, a provision modeled on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7 (West Supp. 1995).
254. See, e.g., North Assocs. v. Bell, 184 Cal. App. 3d 860, 865, 229 Cal. Rptr.
305,308 (1986); Jones v. Drain, 149 Cal. App. 3d 484, 489-90, 196 Cal. Rptr. 827, 831
(1983).
255. See Rowe, supra note 13, at 660-61.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
257. Bauguess v. Paine, 22 Cal. 3d 626, 637-38, 586 P.2d 942, 948-49, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 461, 467-68 (1978). The California Legislature subsequently enacted CAL. Crv.
PROC. CODE§ 128.5 in 1981 to provide the statutory basis for an award of sanctions that
the Bauguess court held were necessary. See Stats. 1981, c. 762, § 2, reprinted in CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5, Historical Note, at 264 (West 1982).
258. Bauguess, 22 Cal. 3d at 638, 586 P.2d at 949, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
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threat of monetary sanctions against either themselves or their clients.259 Broad application of section 1717 to discourage frivolous
litigation directly implicates these policy arguments.
Remedies for frivolous litigation tactics already exist. Courts may
impose sanctions under the appropriate statutes,260 and a party may
seek sanctions or bring a malicious prosecution action after the initial
suit is over.261 Section 1717 was not intended to be, and should not
be used as, a substitute for sanctions and malicious prosecution actions.
Courts may turn to section 1717 as an alternative to these existing
remedies because they are encumbered by a number of procedural
hurdles making them difficult to enforce. A malicious prosecution
action requires the prevailing party to bring a second, separate action in
which it must prove that the plaintiff in the underlying action lacked
probable cause and was motivated by malice in filing the complaint.262
A litigant who has just been forced to endure years of litigation may
well choose to forego a second opportunity to litigate against the same
party. It also may be difficult to win such a suit because the plaintiff
has the onerous task of proving malicious intent in filing the initial
complaint.263 Furthermore, malicious prosecution is a disfavored cause
of action and courts are hesitant to extend liability under this theory. 264

259. Id.
260. In addition to CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (now CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 128.7), sanctions are also available under CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 396b(b) (West
Supp. 1995) for filing an action in the wrong court; under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 437c
(West Supp. 1995) for filing an affidavit in a summary judgment motion in bad faith;
under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 1038 (West Supp. 1995) for bringing a proceeding under
the California Tort Claims Act or for indemnity or contribution in bad faith; under CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE§ 907 (West 1980) for filing a frivolous appeal; and under CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 2023 (West Supp. 1995) for abuse of the discovery process. These
provisions are considerably narrower in application than CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§§ 128.5
and 128.7.
261. A malicious prosecution action is not completely analogous to a sanctions
motion or § 1717 motion. A prevailing party can recover consequential damages as well
as attorneys' fees in a successful malicious prosecution action. See Babb v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 848 n.4, 479 P.2d 379, 383 n.4, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 183 n.4 (1971).
Recourse is limited to litigation costs in both a sanctions motion under § 128.5 and in
a§ 1717 motion. Brewsterv. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 235 Cal. App. 3d 701, 710-12,
1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 94-96 (1991).
262. Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863, 871, 765 P.2d 498,
501, 254 Cal. Rptr. 336, 340 (1989).
263. Id. at 871-72, 765 P.2d at 501-02, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
264. See, e.g., Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 847, 479 P.2d 379, 382, 92
Cal. Rptr. 179, 182 (1971). The rationale for this disfavored status is that courts are wary
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A sanctions motion also entails a difficult and time-consuming
process. Due process considerations require that the sanctioned party be
given notice and an opportunity to be heard before sanctions are
imposed.265 If the aggrieved party seeks a sanctions award, she must
bring a separate motion, where she must prove that the other party acted
in bad faith. 266 If the court raises the issue of sanctions on its own
motion, it must give notice of its intent in order to provide the sanctioned party an opportunity to respond.267 As in the case of malicious
prosecution, a court must find subjective bad faith in order to impose
sanctions.268 Trial courts may be hesitant to find that litigants and
attorneys appearing before them have acted in bad faith, especially when
those attorneys are well known to the court. 269
In contrast, a party entitled to recover attorneys' fees under section
1717 simply files an attorneys' fees motion when filing the costs
bill.270 The losing party's conduct is not in issue. This is precisely
why section 1717 should not be used to punish frivolous litigants. All
of the procedural protections found in a sanctions motion are absent in
section 1717 because the statute was not intended for punishment.271

of the "chilling effect" that malicious prosecution actions may have on a citizen's
willingness to bring a civil dispute to court or to report criminal conduct. Sheldon Appel
Co., 47 Cal. 3d at 872, 765 P.2d at 501-02, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 340 (1989).
265. Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers, 222 Cal. App. 3d 970,976,272 Cal. Rptr. 126,
129-30 (1990). ·
266. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 128.7 (West Supp. 1995).
267. See Barrientos v. City of Los Angeles, 30 Cal. App. 4th 63, 70, 35 Cal. Rptr.
2d 520, 524 (1994); Bergman v. Rifkind & Sterling, Inc., 227 Cal. App. 3d 1380, 1387,
278 Cal. Rptr. 583, 587 (1991).
.
268. See, e.g., West Coast Dev. v. Reed, 2 Cal. App. 4th 693, 702, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d
790, 795 (1992). Some earlier cases had held that only "objective" bad faith was
required. See, e.g., On v. Cow Hollow Properties., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1568, 1575, 272
Cal. Rptr. 535, 539 (1990); Bach v. McNelis, 207 Cal. App. 3d 852,876,255 Cal. Rptr.
232, 246 (1989). Other courts have subsequently criticized these cases, however. See
Javor v. Dellinger, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1258, 1261-62, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662, 664 (1992).
269. See Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666,689 n.12, 881 P.2d 1083, 1095 n.12,
34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 398 n.12 (1994) (noting this phenomenon in the case before it).
In addition, the fact that sanctions awards greater than $1000 must be reported to the
State Bar for possible disciplinary action pursuant to CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 6068(0)(3) and 6086.7(c) (West Supp. 1995) may also serve as a deterrent to wider
use of sanctions, especially where counsel are personally known to the presiding judge.
270. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 1033.S(a)(lO)(A) (West Supp. 1995) provides that
attorneys' fees authorized by contract are allowable costs that may be recovered by the
prevailing party. In addition, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 1033.5(c)(5) (West Supp. 1995)
provides, "Attorney's fees awarded pursuant to Section 1717 of the Civil Code are
allowable costs under Section 1032...." California Rules of Court provide the
procedural guidelines.for a motion for costs, including attorneys' fees. CAL. CT. R.
870(a)(l), 870.2.
271. For the due process protections required in a sanctions motion, see supra text
accompanying notes 265-69. For the legislative intent behind § 1717, see supra text
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While the conduct of the litigants is certainly one factor that may be
included in a broad fee-shifting proposal, it is not an appropriate basis
for fee-shifting in a random selection of contract actions based on the
whims of the presiding judge. The Legislature may choose to pursue
this idea in the future, but the courts should not do so on an ad hoc
basis.272 Section 1717 was not intended to be and should not be
applied as such a broad departure from the American Rule.

E.

Settlement

Increasing the settlement rate could also favor applying fee-shifting
under section 1717 to non-signatories. Some have argued that the
increased risk of paying the other side's attorneys' fees under the British
Rule will lead litigants to settle at higher rates than under the American
Rule. 273 Thus, wider application of fee-shifting should cause a higher
rate of settlement. 274 If this argument generally supports wider feeshifting, it should also support fee-shifting under section 1717 in cases
involving contractual non-signatories.
This argument fails on two levels. On general principles, it is not
clear whether the British or the American Rule is better at inducing
settlement. Commentators have disagreed intensely on this point.275
There is no conclusive proof that the British Rule in general is better at

accompanying notes 36-40.
272. Bauguess v. Paine, 22 Cal. 3d 626, 637, 586 P.2d 942, 948, 150 Cal. Rptr.
461, 467 (1978) (holding that courts do not have the power to use fee awards as
sanctions in the absence of specific statutory authorization). The California Legislature
has already created a pilot program, effective until January 1, 1996, partially repealing
the American Rule in Riverside and San Bernardino Counties, which incorporates this
principle. If a party rejects an offer of settlement under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998
(West Supp. 1995) and thereafter becomes liable to pay a judgment less favorable than
the § 998 offer, the party becomes liable to pay the prevailing parties' attorneys' fees.
Among the factors courts are directed to consider in allowing fee-shifting are the good
faith of the losing party in the litigation and the merits of the claim that was the subject
of the action. CAL. CIV. PRoc CODE §§ 1021.l(c)(l)(A), (c)(4) (West Supp. 1995).
Governor Wilson has proposed legislation to make this statute a permanent state-wide
fee-shifting rule. See CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE ANALYSIS STATEMENT, BILL No. AB 54,
May 10, 1995.
273. See Donohue, supra note 22, at 1107-08; Smith, supra note 22, at 2157.
274. Id.
275. Compare the authorities cited supra note 17, arguing that the American Rule
induces more settlements, and the authorities cited supra note 22, arguing that the British
Rule is more favorable for settlement.
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inducing parties to settle.276 Furthermore, if the British Rule does have
a higher settlement rate, a disproportionate impact on the disadvantaged
is the most likely cause. Poor individuals will be more risk averse
because they can ill afford the chance of losing and incurring the costs
of the prevailing party's attorneys' fees. 277 This risk would deter
poorer litigants from bringing an action. Rich litigants, including
corporations and government institutions, could more easily bear this
risk. 278 In addition, rich litigants engaging in more litigation are better
able to absorb the costs of losing because they can balance losses in
some cases with wins in others.279 In sum, the British Rule will
encourage settlement and deter the most risk averse parties from initially
filing claims because the British Rule increases the risk of loss. Those
more risk averse parties are likely to be poorer individuals. The least
risk averse parties are likely to be large corporations. Thus, wider feeshifting would have the opposite effect of that intended by the passage
of section 1717, which was to level the playing field between individuals
and large corporations.280 It would not encourage individuals to
vindicate their claims against large corporations through the legal
system. In fact, it would discourage such suits.
On the specific level of current application of the British Rule to
contractual non-signatories under section 1717, uncertainty about
whether fee-shifting applies will sometimes make settlement less likely
than under the pure American Rule. If there is uncertainty, one litigant
may assume fee-shifting will occur and incorporate this conclusion into
settlement decisions, while another litigant may come to the opposite
conclusion and arrive at different calculus. For example, if plaintiff
believes that the British Rule of fee-shifting applies, she will factor this
into the settlement negotiations. If defendant believes that the American
Rule applies, then she will not factor in the risk of having to pay

a

276. See Donohue, supra note 22, at 1094 (arguing tliat the rate of settlement under
the British and American Rules will be identical in practice); Mause, supra note 11, at
31-33 (noting that effects of fee-shifting rule on settlement rates will vary with the type
of case involved and that no general trend can be predicted); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
Predicting the Effects ofAttorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 15464 (1984) (same); Snyder & Hughes, supra note 16, at 370-75 (noting that empirical
evidence does not support the British Rule).
277. See text and authorities cited supra notes 233-35.
278. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 572; Mause, supra note 11, at 36; Pfennigstorf,
supra note 13, at 77 & n.229 (noting this effect in Europe); Rowe, supra note 276, at
147-48; Monroe, supra note 19, at 165-66.
279. See Galanter, supra note 235, at 99-100 & n.11; Vargo, supra note 6, at 1596;
see also Covenant Mut. Ins. Co. v. Young, 179 Cal. App. 3d 318, 327 n.10, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 861, 867 n.10 (1986).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
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plaintiffs' attorneys' fees if she loses. The parties will thus make
different calculations of the settlement values of their respective cases.
Divergent assumptions could make settlement less likely. 81
In sum, arguments for fee-shifting in favor of contractual nonsignatories under section 1717 provide only weak support for the
practice. Arguments against such wide use of section 1717 are stronger.
CONCLUSION: A PROPOSAL .FOR A RETURN TO PRIVITY

Judicial expansion of section 1717 into cases involving non-signatories
to contracts, and especially into non-contract actions, is unmerited.
Section 1717 was not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as,
a general repeal of one-way fee-shifting provisions. It was explicitly
designed only to eliminate one-way fee-shifting provisions found in mass
consumer contracts. It was not intended to apply generally to nonsignatories in contract actions, and it was certainly not intended to apply
in non-contract actions.282
Inconsistent decisions based on two incoherent theories have marked
application of section 1717 to non-signatories.283 Courts have applied
both estoppel and mutuality theories so haphazardly that they totally lack
logical consistency. No single theory can adequately explain all of the
cases in which courts will find it "equitable" to award fees to a nonsignatory. Thus, in some cases, third party beneficiaries have been
subject to fee-shifting pursuant to section 1717, and in some cases they
have not been.284 In some cases, non-assuming grantees of deeds of
trust have been subject to fee-shifting pursuant to section 1717, and in
others, they have not. 285 Likewise, some non-signatory defendants in
a contract action who prevail on the grounds that the contract is unenforceable have been subject to fee-shifting pursuant to section 1717, and

281. Others have described in detail how parties arrive at expected settlement values
for their cases. The parties' calculations assume three variables: the probability of
plaintiffs success at trial, the amount in controversy, and the litigation costs of both
parties. Different formulae will govern the settlement value of a particular case
depending on whether the American Rule or the British Rule prevails. See Donohue,
supra note 22, at 1096-1100. See generally POSNER, supra note 16, at 571-74; Mause,
supra note 11, at 54-55; Rowe, supra note 13, at 154-70; Shaven, supra note 17.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 186-91.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 192-221.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 200-11.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 123-30, 212-21.
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others have not, such as when the contract is unenforceable on grounds
of illegality.286
In short, courts have shown they will find some way to shift fees
when they believe it is equitable.287 Judges then justify that result with
a theoretical basis. On the other hand, courts will not award fees when
it would appear inequitable, regardless of the theories. 288 In order to
conform results to the theory, courts have had to craft exceptions
eviscerating the logic of the rules. Such a rule-making process will
inevitably create gross inconsistencies and ever more Byzantine
constructions of .ever less plausible theories. Whenever courts simply
rely on their "gut instinct" of what seems fair under the circumstances
of each case, the theories used to justify such decisions will not stand up
to close scrutiny. In fact, there is no theory, only judges deciding an
equitable result based upon their subjective understanding of the facts.
This is not the rule of law.
The inapplicability of section 1717 is particularly compelling in the
case of statutory fee-shifting provisions. By passing such fee-shifting
laws, the California Legislature has expressed a desire for heightened
enforcement of certain statutes by members of the public.289 Making
such one-way fee-shifting provisions reciprocal would destroy the
incentive created by these fee-shifting laws. This would limit enforcement of certain statutes that the Legislature has determined are in the
public interest to have vigilantly enforced.
The obvious solution to the problems with the application of section
1717 to contractual non-signatories is an amendment to section 1717
limiting its application to signatories to the contract in dispute. The
following language could be inserted in paragraph (a) of the statute:
Attorneys' fees provided for by this section shall not be awarded in favor of
any party not a signatory to the contract in dispute in the action. Nor shall any
party not a signatory to the contract in dispute in the action be liable for such
fees to the prevailing party.

This simple provision would end all fee-shifting involving contractual
non-signatories under section 1717.
Some may argue that this solution is drastic and "throws the baby out
with the bath water." This response assumes that fee-shifting in favor
of non-signatories has overall positive effects, despite the problems

286. See supra text accompanying notes 166-68.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98, 117.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 163-170, 208-10.
289. Covenant Mut. Ins. Co. v. Young, 179 Cal. App. 3d 318,328,225 Cal. Rptr.
861, 867-68 (1986).
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associated with it. A comparison of the arguments in favor of and
against such fee-shifting shows that this is not the case.
Application of section 1717 to contractual non-signatories serves no
useful purpose. It does not create more equitable results; it does not
effectively discourage frivolous lawsuits; it does not compensate litigants
for enduring frivolous lawsuits; it does not increase the likelihood of
settlement; it should not be used in place of sanctions to punish frivolous
litigation tactics. Moreover, it has no basis in the statutory language or
purpose; it conflicts with basic contract principles; it is based on
inconsistent legal theories; it creates unpredictable and inconsistent
results; it may lessen the credibility of the judicial system as a rational
dispute resolution mechanism. Section 1717 should, therefore, be strictly
limited to contract actions in cases in which both parties to the litigation
are also parties to the contract. The proposed rule would be easily
administered and produce consistent results that litigants and contracting
parties can understand and upon which they can rely. In sum, such a
rule would observe Voltaire's maxim as it is clear, uniform, and precise,
leaving no room for corruption through interpretation.
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